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The use or consumption of various products, from aircraft engines
to lathes and hairsprays, often results in accidents and injuries, some-
times to the purchaser and sometimes to third parties. The problem
of allocating these losses-a problem which lawyers label "products
liability"-has for many years been a subject of great concern. The
losses referred to have usually resulted from injuries to persons or
property, though in recent years the damages considered have some-
times included what has been termed "economic loss"-the loss
suffered by a user because a product did not provide the expected
services. 2
In choosing among alternative products liability arrangements, one
must consider the effects of these arrangements (1) on fairness or
equity, and (2) on the behavior of various persons affected and hence
on resource allocation. Suppose some innocent non-drinking by-
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stander loses an eye when a beer bottle explodes. To most persons it
seems unfair to have the bystander bear the entire burden unaided,
and they prefer institutional arrangements that yield some other out-
come. Most thoughtful persons will also be concerned with the ways
in which behavior and hence resource allocation are affected. If
customers and bystanders could not inflict meaningful penalties,
through bargaining, through reduced purchases of risky products, or
through lawsuits-bottlers might be sorry about these accidents, but
they would not find the accidents as disadvantageous as they would
if they had to pay additional penalties. They would find it relatively
inexpensive to put beer in low quality, hazardous containers, and
such accidents would be relatively frequent (in comparison with a
situation in which producers paid higher penalties). On the other
hand, if competitive pressure or judicially imposed liability forced
bottlers to bear part of the damages, such accidents would become
comparatively expensive to the bottlers, and they would find it rela-
tively rewarding to put beer in less hazardous containers. The de-
gree of adaptation would depend on the severity of the penalty. To
take an extreme illustration, if the penalties were sufficiently large,
bottlers might find it economical to put beer in supersafe containers
that cost $5 each, even though it meant selling much less beer, re-
ducing output, and releasing resources which would then be shifted
to other uses. In short, (except in certain hypothetical circumstances)
alternative arrangements will have different impacts on production
processes, the purchase of insurance, the way particular resources are
used, the allocation of resources, and the options open to consumers,
as well as on fairness.
This study reviews (1) the literature on products liability and (2)
the economic implications of products liability law to determine
whether these implications are being discussed critically and care-
fully. Needless to say, it is hoped that the study will be useful in it-
self. More importantly, however, it is hoped that the study will
stimulate economists to be concerned more frequently with real life
legislation, court decisions, and institutional arrangements, and stim-
ulate lawyers to be concerned more systematically with the economic
implications of the legal framework generally. Along these lines, it
seems important for both groups, when discussing policies, to appre-
ciate the extent to which they are employing tested hypotheses about
the consequences of alternative actions and the extent to which they
are utilizing their individual judgments about untested propositions.
This study of products liability should help emphasize the fact that
there are a few, but only a few, tested hypotheses about behavior and
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that our judgments concerning the consequences of alternative arrange-
ments can often legitimately differ. This fact, plus the fact that we must
judge the values of those consequences, leads to understandable dis-
agreement about policy. It is perhaps all the more important, therefore,
to try to clarify the implications (and the uncertainties about the impli-
cations) of alternative institutions.
I. Do WE HAvE CRITERIA OF FAIRNESS AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE
ALLOCATION?
It might be stressed at the outset that this paper will not attempt
to identify optimal policies but will simply trace out some of the con-
sequences of products liability arrangements to determine whether
commentators recognize the implications of different arrangements.
Indeed, as far as optimality is concerned, while each individual can
identify the policies he prefers, there is no criterion of preferredness
that all members of a group are compelled by logic to accept.
Consider fairness. What is fair or equitable? We cannot ascend
some mountain and find a tablet revealing an answer that is neces-
sarily correct for all persons. It is not that values are relative; you
might believe that your values are correct for everyone, and I might
insist that mine are correct, but the two sets of values would not
necessarily coincide, and there would be no way for me to demon-
strate that mine are right. In the example cited above, most persons
would agree that for the innocent bystander to bear the costs would
be unfair. (Some persons might disagree even with that proposition
if, for example, the bystander was very wealthy and the others in-
volved were poor widows and orphans.) To most persons it would
also seem unfair for the buyer to shoulder the financial burden due
to the exploding bottle. But at least some persons might regard it
as inequitable for any group we could name, for example, taxpayers
in general, to bear the financial burden.
Moreover, to choose the optimal policy, the trade-offs between
fairness (that is, whatever redistributions of wealth one likes) and
improved resource allocation or "total output" would have to be
specified.3 But there are no "correct" rates at which the nation should
trade fairness for economic efficiency, and there is little likelihood
that people could agree regarding such rates. Thus, for this reason
too, one can hardly say that a particular policy is preferred from the
standpoint of society.
3 If transaction costs compelled us to trade effidency in order to achieve greater equity.
For the non-economist these concepts will be explained later.
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Furthermore, there is no ultimately correct criterion of optimal
resource allocation. Consider a little nation of three people. Is it
right to allocate resources so as to maximize the combination of
goods specified by individual A? Is it correct to allocate resources in
accordance with the wishes of the majority? Should resources be
used so that each person is as well off as he can be, as he sees his
well-being, without making someone else worse off, as he sees his well-
being? (Voluntary exchanges tend to work toward this last situation.)
None of these goals is inherently correct. Logic does not forbid one
to prefer something else.
II. DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING PRODUCTS LABILrrY4
Liability for damages inflicted on others has a long history. Even
in early eras the ill will of part of the community and the threat of
retaliation must have imposed penalties on persons who damaged
others. By the Middle Ages, fairly strict liability for injuries-with-
out direct contract, misrepresentation, or evidence of negligence-
was often the rule.5 Later, as industrial societies developed, greater
freedom of action was stressed, and liability was imposed only if "due
care" was not exercised and then only in a restricted range of circum-
stances.
I One of the most important conditions for liability for a defective
product was the existence of privity, or a direct contractual re-
lationship. A manufacturer might be liable to the wholesaler, the
wholesaler to the retailer, and the retailer to his customer, but the
manufacturer was not liable to remote customers, and nobody was
liable to third parties because there was no contractual relationship
with them. In general, though there were exceptions, the require-
ment of privity was upheld in England and the United States
throughout the 19th century. In one famous case, Winterbottom v.
Wright," in which a coach with a defective wheel had overturned,
4 Only the high spots will be reviewed here. For more detail see such articles as Leavell,
The Return of Caveat Venditor as the Law of Products Liability, 23 Asu. L. REv. 355
(1969), or Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YAL-E L.J. 887 (1967). An especially comprehensive
survey is in Noel, Manufacturers of Products-the Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN.
L. REv. 963 (1957). A very readable summary, written by an eminent authority on the
subject, is Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). See also Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products
Be Liable Without Negligence? 24 TENN. L. REv. 928 .(1957).
W. Hamilton's famous article, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YAMX L.J. 1133
(1931), gives a fascinating history of the difficulties confronting the buyer from the Middle
Ages until recent times. Most of the cases pertain to outright fraud, however, and have
little bearing on products liability issues today.
5 See generally Green, supra note 4, at 930-32.
8 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (E. 1842).
[Vol. M83
Products Liability-McKean
Lord Abinger said: "There is no privity of contract between these
parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any
person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of
the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the opera-
tion of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them,
the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no
limit, would ensue." 7
Even with the privity requirement, most persons suffering injury
or loss could do several things to help themselves. First, where privity
existed, the buyer could seek compensation from the seller. (And,
where one person's action directly injured another, the injured party
could also seek a court judgment, though such cases take us away
from the category of products liability.) Second, the injured party
could sue for fraud. The requirements for recovery on this basis were
rather stringent, however: the seller must have knowingly8 and in-
tentionally8 committed the fraud, the buyer must have justifiably"
relied on the representation, and damage resulting from the fraud
must have occurred.9 Still, liability for fraud did not depend on
privity, was not thwarted by disclaimers, could encompass economic
loss and punitive damages, 10 and was (as it still is) an important part
of the law pertaining to liability.
Third, the existence of even moderate competition gives the cus-
tomer some protection." Most firms must worry about attracting
customers from other businesses and about preventing customers from
turning to rival firms. In deciding how safe to make their products,
what kind of warnings and disclaimers to issue, what to do in case
customers suffer injuries, and how generous to be in replacing defec-
tive items, managements will weigh the costs of proceeding in any of
7 Id. at 405. Another member of the court added, "This is one of those unfortunate
cases in which there certainly has been a damnum, but it is a damnum absque injuria;
it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but by that con-
sideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are
apt to introduce bad law."
Most persons find Lord Abinger's words amusing nowadays, but he was probably worried
(though he had his own mind made up) about the basic issues that are still with us:
would the abandonment of privity, or other steps toward strict liability of producers,
bring more cost than gain?
8 Economists might note the imprecision of these requirements and of the provisions
and definitions cited subsequently. A great deal is left to the discretion of the courts. This
may seem highly undesirable, but a little reflection suggests that spelling out provisions
unambiguously would usually be uneconomical, that is, would cost more than it would
gain (as most of us would assess the costs and gains).
9 Sebert, Products Liability-the Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort
Liability, 64 Micn. L. REv. 1850, 1351 (1966).
1o Id. at 1354.
11 See the thoughtful article by Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries
Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957).
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these directions against the gains from doing so. Even if monopoly
power exists, but particularly if there is at least moderate competition,
producers will find it relatively expensive to neglect all safety features,
to issue little information about their products, to ignore injuries
resulting from the use of their products, and to allow few returns of
defective or undesired items. They will find it expensive in terms of
the impact on future sales and thence on profits, even if court judg-
ments rarely help the buyer.12 Indeed, with respect to minor consumer
losses and complaints, one must rely mainly on competition to con-
strain producers, because it is too costly to go to court over books with
such small print that they cause headaches or shirts that are damaged
by the laundry.
A. Evolution of Sales Law
The above safeguards (the forces of competition, liability for fraud,
and products liability where privity exists) were long ago deemed
insufficient in connection with certain products and activities. There
is a lengthy history of special concern about foods and about "in-
herently or imminently dangerous" or "ultrahazardous" products
(e.g., explosives). Only "a decade after Winterbottom v. Wright, the
New York Court of Appeals in Thomas v. Winchester13 held a man-
ufacturer liable to a consumer where a bottle of belladonna had been
mislabelled 'dandelion,' and caused injury to the plaintiff. Lack of priv-
ity, said the court, is no defense."' 4 In fact, quite a few exceptions to the
privity rule developed late in the 19th and early in the 20th centuries.' 5
In developing special rules for these categories of products, the
courts were probably groping, unconsciously, for changes in the as-
signment of rights that would yield more gain than cost.'8 Where
injuries resulted from the use of foods, products involving intimate
bodily use, or "ultrahazardous" products, one might have argued that
either private contracting or liability with fault plus the privity re-
quirement yielded inequities and inefficiencies because of heavy in-
formation costs that might be reduced. Interest in liability for injuries
from these products rose as events made the effects more important or
12 This is not to say, of course, that competition will move manufacturers to turn out
completely safe products, dry cleaners never to lose buttons, or producers to compensate
customers for all damages or disappointments. Also, if competition is extremely weak,
its effects will be weak. Your phone company, public school, or tax assessor will not be
greatly worried for fear you might turn to a competitor.
13 6 N.Y. S97 (1852).
14 Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? I DuQouEsNE U.L. Rrv. 1, 49, 50
(1963).
15 Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 10 M N. L. REv. 1 (1925).
18 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1, 19-27 (1960).
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caused people to regard the effects as being more important than
before. For example, concern about foods soared after the publication
of Upton Sinclair's books. 17
Such categories of products were highly imperfect for the purpose
of assigning liabilities, yet their use may have seemed preferable to
always requiring privity. Ambiguities abound, for instance, in the
label "dangerous product." If it is misused, a paring knife can be
dangerous; if information is sufficiently poor, foods can be dangerous;
if quality control is poor enough, many metal (and other) products
can be hazardous; some drugs and cosmetics are ultrahazardous for
some persons though not for most. If the hazard is well known or
obvious, there may be no hazard as far as courts' assignment of liabil-
ities is concerned. (A few years ago cigarette manufacturers might
have been held liable for lung cancers attributed to smoking; now
there is more inclination to regard the risk as an obvious one that
the smoker knowingly accepts.) As these categories developed, these
ambiguities allowed the courts leeway in weighing the harmful effects
of judgments against the good effects, and the results were probably
better than the results of firm, dear-cut rules would have been.' 8 To
repeat, the courts were apparently probing for improved rules, even
though the arguments were imprecise and the new arrangements in-
evitably far from perfect.
The major breakthrough, however, came in 1916 in the famous
case of the collapsing automobile, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.19
The New York Court of Appeals held that the manufacturer was
liable, in the absence of privity, for injuries resulting from the use of a
product, whether or not inherently dangerous, if there was evidence
of "negligence" in the manufacture or assembly of the product. Judge
Cardozo, writing for the court, apparently expressed a view that many
persons had come to hold and that was soon to have enormous in-
fluence: "We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard
life and limb, when the consequence of negligence may be foreseen,
grows out of contract and nothing else."20
17 Prosser notes that Upton Sinclair "said later that he had aimed at the public's
heart, and by accident hit it in the stomach." Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and
Drug Legislation, 1 LAw & CONTEM. PROB. 3, 9 (1933), cited by Prosser, supra note 4,
at 1106.
i8 As Coase notes, such phrases as "Users must handle products with reasonable care"
suggest that judges were seeking to weigh harm against utility. Coase, supra note 16, at
22.
19 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
20 While the general thrust of this view is dear, note that it too is far from unam-
biguous. Do producers have a duty to turn out only completely safe products? Pursuing
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After MacPherson, this position was adopted in case after case, and
eventually in all states (with the possible exception of Mississippi).
The ruling was applied not just to special categories, such as food,
firearms, and explosives, but to such varied products as a sanitary
napkin,21 an inflammable celluloid comb,22 and a defective bar stool.23
MacPherson led to a number of widely accepted, but not universal,
rules. Those who may be liable include producers of component parts,
assemblers, lessors who rent products to their customers, firms that
repair or recondition, and firms that label a product their own even
though some other firm actually manufactures the item. The product
must usually have posed significant danger to life and limb (though
even under the MacPherson doctrine, awards for property losses were
occasionally made), and courts have generally refused to make awards
for injuries arising from minor hazards, such as a defective high heel
or a coffee-can key.2 4 Nonetheless, as a result of MacPherson, there was
unquestionably a major shift toward producer liability in a broader
range of circumstances.
Other extensions of such liability were brought about through ad
hoc devices. It is often difficult to prove negligence on the part of a
manufacturer, but in some instances the courts chose to take negligence
for granted, applying the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur": let the mat-
ter speak for itself. If a bottle of soft drink is found to contain a
cockroach, it seems quite unlikely that anyone, after the bottling was
completed, opened the container and inserted the insect. The courts
assumed that the production process involved negligence.25 Similarly,
if a sealed unit in a refrigerator or machine caused damage, it was
not always necessary to prove that there was negligence; the courts
often concluded that the matter spoke for itself. 26
Another way of getting around the privity requirement was to re-
gard the wife who buys an item as an agent for her husband so that,
even though he has no direct contractual relationship with the seller,
the latter may be liable if the husband is injured while using the
product.27 It was also decided that liability extended to third party
such a goal would eventually bring costs in excess of gains in almost everyone's eyes,
and achieving the goal is simply impossible.
21 La Frumento v. Kotex Co., 131 Misc. 314, 226 N.YS. 750 (New York City Ct. 1928).
22 Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930).
23 Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp., 26 N.J, Super. 295, 97 A.2d 699 (1953).
24 Timpson v. Marshall, Meadows & Stewart, Inc., 198 Misc. 1034, 101 N.Y.S.2d 583
(Sup. Ct. 1950); Boyd'v. American Can Co., 249 App. Div. 644, 291 N.Y.S. 205 (1936).
For a discussion and other citations, see Noel, supra note 4, at 969.
25 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
26 Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co., 266 Wis. 680, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954).
27 Haut v. Kleene, 320 Ill. App. 273, 50 N.E2d 855 (1943). In this case, it was the wife
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beneficiaries, including guests in the home,28 but not bystanders29
Other extensions of liability to instances where there was no direct
contract resulted from the master-servant rule (respondeat superior),
under which it was held that the master must answer for injuries
caused by the servant.30
These devices are often criticized as being tortured or "artificial"
attempts to introduce strict producer liability. It is true that, if there
were perfect knowledge, such categories or lines of demarcation would
be absurd, but under conditions of uncertainty one might without
being illogical judge these rules to be better than the alternatives. The
courts were (properly, it seems to me) uneasy about proceeding to strict
liability lest it result in more harm than good, yet they felt that these
small steps would yield more good than harm. (Similarly one might be
uneasy about permitting automobiles to proceed in the face of a red
traffic light if drivers deem it safe, yet feel confident that allowing
right turns on a red light would yield more good than harm.)
Another development that reflects the shift toward caveat venditor
has been the expanded possibility of recovering on grounds of fraud.
As noted earlier, recovery for fraud has several prerequisites; but in
recent years, the courts have been making it somewhat easier for the
plaintiff to win, particularly by having less stringent requirements
concerning the knowledge of falsity by the defendant and reliance by
the plaintiff on the producer's representations.31 Since recovery on
grounds of fraud is not barred by disclaimers, does not require any
suggestion of warranty, and may yield punitive damages, these de-
velopments may be fairly important. In any event, they also widen the
range of circumstances in which the producer may be liable.
An important development has been the increase in producers' liabil-
ity based on express and, particularly, implied warranty. (This change
could be regarded as part of the evolution of strict liability under tort
law rather than the evolution of sales law, but at least many of these
who suffered injury, in fact death, due to preparing food (rabbits) that had been purchased
by the husband.
28 Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wash. 2d 720, 393 P.2d 956 (1964); Welch v. Schiebel-
huth, 11 Misc. 2d 312, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957). These cases involved, respectively,
a child guest who fell through a plate glass window, and relatives who were guests and
ate a cake that contained toxic elements.
29 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962),
involving a bystander who was hit in the eye by a piece of a rubber disk that disinte-
grated.
80 For instance, a firm is usually liable if an employee uses a machine, while on duty,
so as to injure someone. Southern Paramont Pictures Co. v. Gaulding, 24 Ga. App. 478,
101 S.E. 311 (1919).
81 Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort
Liability, 64 MiCa. L. Rxv. 1350, 1351-52 (1966).
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changes occurred before the famous Henningsen32 case, to be discussed
in the next section.) Perhaps the best way to indicate the main thrust
of this development is to compare some of the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) with the provisions that were generally ac-
cepted previously. The UCC is a compilation of sales and commercial
law which was designed for adoption by each state, so that uniform
provisions among the states would emerge.3 3 Under the Code (as
adopted, for example, by Kentucky) express warranty is now deemed to
arise, not merely out of affirmations about a product upon which the
buyer relies and which induce the purchaser to buy the product, but
also out of the use of description or samples or models.3 4 There need
be no specific intention to warrant. All goods sold must now be like
the sample; it is no longer enough that the "bulk" of such goods be
"in reasonable conformity" with the sample.
It is implied warranty, however, that has been extended in highly
significant ways. An implied warranty of "merchantability" now grows
out of every sale where the seller is a "merchant," including the sale of
food to be consumed on the premises (formerly excluded). Needless to
say, these phrases are ambiguous. Thus, some persons interpret mer-
chantable to mean free of defect, which simply substitutes for "defect"
another term to be defined; and the UCO defines merchantable to
mean that the goods must pass without objection in the trade, have
fair average quality fit for ordinary purposes for which the goods are
used, be adequately packaged, and fulfill the promises on the con-
tainer.3, Also, as some decisions moved in the direction of strict liability
in tort, implied warranty was in effect expanded greatly.30 Despite
ambiguities and disagreement, these developments increase the prob-
ability that a manufacturer or other seller will be liable when losses
occur.
The UCC also recognizes an implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose as distinct from the item's ordinary purpose.37 For this
warranty to hold, the seller must have reason to know the particular
purpose, but it is not necessary for the buyer to have informed the
32 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
83 All states except Louisiana have now accepted the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
84 Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection under
Warranty Law, 49 Ky. L.J. 240, 242-43 (1960).
35 Id. at 244, citing UNIFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(l).
30 Recent developments are not completely consistent, with the rules of contract being
modified on the one hand, but with liability in tort also being mentioned, which would
make the rules of contract largely irrelevant. Again see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MNN. L. Rnv. 791, 831-40 (1966).
37 UNIORM ComCas AL CODE § 2-315.
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seller; the buyer must be relying on the seller's judgment in selecting
or furnishing the goods (formerly the seller was liable only if he selected
the goods); and purchase by trade name no longer implies that the
buyer is relying on his own judgment rather than the seller's. The
course of dealing and trade usage may generate implied warranties; for
example, the court may decide that trade usage provides the seller
with "reason to know" the particular purpose to which goods are put
in a particular locality.38
The Code refrains from taking a stand on the privity issue, but it
does try to reduce the cost of successive lawsuits by preventing a man-
ufacturer from challenging the fact determinations of an earlier suit-
if the manufacturer refused to appear in the earlier suit.3 9 Disclaimers,
while still playing important roles in sales relationships, have become
less effective in preventing producer liability.40 Under the UCC the
disclaimer rules are codified.41 Disclaimers must be "reasonable" and
cannot negate express warranties (though an "entirety" clause stating
that the contract contains all the agreed-upon terms maynullify war-
ranties made orally). A major aim is to prevent the use of disclaimers
that are likely to be overlooked by purchasers. If fitness for a particular
purpose is denied, it must be in "conspicuous writing." Implied war-
ranty can be nullified by the purchaser's refusal to inspect or by his
failure to detect defects that his inspection "should" have detected.
42
Also, a seller can still sell an item "as is," eliminating all implied war-
ranties, if he makes this dear.
Advertising directly to consumers can create warranties to them. In
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,43 the manufacturer was held to be liable
because a windshield advertised as shatterproof did in fact shatter when
struck by a stone. At the same time a certain amount of "puffing" in
advertisements or sales talks is regarded as permissible. A normal buyer
is apparently assumed to discount the seller's views to allow for some
tacitly understood or expected degree of optimism about the product.
88 Note, supra note 34, at 249.
89 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607.
40 As strict liability under tort (see Part B infIra) became accepted in cases where per-
sonal injuries were involved, disclaimers seemed to be irrelevant, since contract law was
irrelevant in such instances. But in fact, disclaimers are still pertinent to the outcomes of
such lawsuits.
41 UNIFORM COMMER LAL CODE § 2-316.
42 A seller of lumber was held not liable for injuries resulting from a board breaking
since the customer had had plenty of opportunity to inspect and test the lumber and avoid
the danger, Collum v. Pope & Talbot, 135 Cal. App. 2d 784, 288 P.2d 75 (1955), cited in
Green, supra note 4, at 936.
48 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
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B. Recent Shifts toward Strict Liability under Tort
Strict liability under tort can be defined loosely as liability because
a wrong was done or a "duty" neglected, not because a contract was
unfulfilled. No imputation of negligence is necessary (though a "de-
fect," which may to some extent simply substitute another word for
negligence, is necessary), and no contract need be implicated. To many
observers it appears that products liability has been evolving rapidly
in recent years toward strict liability under tort. The following are
typical comments: "With privity on the wane, caveat venditor will be
the rule, not caveat emptor; the time has come to hold a requiem for
this . . . anachronism. ' 44 "It seems safe to predict that strict liability
for products will soon be the established law in this country."45
But even strict liability does not mean liability for injury or eco-
nomic loss regardless of circumstances. There must be reason to be-
lieve the product was "defective." The user must employ the product
in a reasonable manner (a hammer manufacturer will not be held liable
simply because a user of the hammer manages to hit himself in the
head with it). And there are many other issues that are left open-
many circumstances in which producers would still not be liable. Be-
fore considering these issues, however, let us review the recent steps
that have led toward strict liability.
"In the field of products liability, the date of the fall of the citadel
of privity can be fixed with some certainty. It was May 9, 1960, when
the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced the decision in Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc."'4 7,4 Mr. Henningsen had purchased a
car manufactured by Chrysler Corporation from Bloomfield Motors, a
dealer. Mrs. Henningsen suffered injuries when the car suddenly
veered to the right and ran into a wall, presumably due to a defective-
steering gear. Without any evidence of negligence on the part of the
manufacturer, the court held Chrysler as well as the dealer liable, ex-
plaining: "An implied warranty that it (the product) is reasonably
suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate
purchaser. Absence of agency . . . is immaterial."4 The court also
said, "We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between
a fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile." 49 There had
been earlier and unsuccessful attempts to put automobiles in the cat-
44 Jaeger, supra note 14, at 142.
45 Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 5 (1965).
46 82 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
47 Prosser, supra note 36, at 791.
48 52 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
49 Id. at 383, 161 A2d at 83.
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egory of "deadly and dangerous instrumentalities" or to apply the rules
for "ferocious animals" to the "devil wagon,"50 but Henningsen ap-
peared to eliminate the requirements for privity and negligence with
respect to all products and to put the effectiveness of disclaimers in
doubt. Within a few years the Henningsen precedent was followed in
state after state in case after case pertaining to a wide variety of prod-
ucts, including a glass door, shotgun, abrasive disc, electric cable,
pleasure boat, dental chair, and hula skirt.51
Among the important subsequent cases was Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp.,52 which seemed to discard all previous guidelines
in order to seek a "just" compromise among conflicting interests.53
This supported the trend toward strict liability, for the decision did
not hinge on privity or negligence, and indeed the decision described
the situation as one of "strict tort liability." In this case Lockheed
had purchased altimeters from Kollsman and installed them in the
aircraft it manufactured. One of the planes, flown by American Air-
lines, crashed. A defective altimeter was allegedly the cause of the
accident. The estate of a deceased passenger brought an action against
the carrier, the parts manufacturer, and Lockheed. The case raised
complicated issues of choice of law, privity, and warranty, but for this
paper the significant thing was that the New York Court of Appeals
rested its decision on the law of tort. A special feature of Kolisman
was that, in the end, the court freed the parts manufacturer from
liability, not because privity or negligence was lacking but because
he felt that the airplane manufacturer's liability provided sufficient pro-
tection to the passengers!
A more important landmark was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.,54 in which the purchaser of a power tool, a combination saw-
drill-lathe, sued the manufacturer. There was nothing wrong that
would ordinarily be called a defect, but the design of the tool was such
that it was able to hurl a piece of wood through the air, hitting and
injuring the user. In this decision Justice Traynor explicitly stated
that ". . . the liability is not one governed by the law of contract war-
ranties but by the law of strict liability in tort."' 5 Hence it made no
50 Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50, 55, 59 S.E. 338, 340 (1907), cited in Ehrenzweig,
Negligence Without Fault, 54 CALs. L. REv. 1422, 1435 (1966) (originally published in
1951).
51 For details see Prosser, supra note 36, at 794-98.
52 12 N.Y2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.YS.2d 592 (1963).
53 Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1081 (1965).
54 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
55 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, quoted in Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel, supra note 36, at 804. At this point Prosser also cites numerous subsequent cases
in which the courts agreed with Traynor's view.
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difference whether there was privity or negligence on the part of the
manufacturer, or whether the purchaser had provided notice of breach
of warranty in the proper way. And the decision seemingly broadened
further the possible interpretations of the word "defect."
A New Jersey court decided that, in view of Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, strict liability in tort applied to "economic loss" as
well as to personal injuries. In Santor v. A. 8c M. Karagheusian, Inc.,5 6
a man bought a rug for his business establishment and allegedly suf-
fered losses of sales and profits when the rug rapidly changed to an
unattractive color. The rug was judged to be unmerchantable or de-
fective, and the purchaser collected from the manufacturer without
the existence of privity, a showing of negligence, the occurrence of
any personal injuries, or resort to sales law. Seely v. White Motor
Co.,57 however, "pulled the rug out from under the Santor decision"
according to one pun-loving writer.5 8 The plaintiff bought a truck for
his business operation. The truck seemed to have something wrong
with its weight distribution, at least for the purpose for which it was
bought, and it "galloped," caused persistent difficulties, and eventually
overturned. While partial damages were awarded, the court went out
of its way to say that absolute liability in tort should not apply to
pocketbook losses:
We are of the opinion.., that it was inappropriate to impose
liability on that basis in the Santor case, for it would result in
imposing liability without regard to what representations of
quality the manufacturer made. . . . Had the manufacturer
not so described the rug, but sold it "as is," or sold it disclaim-
ing any guarantee of quality, there would have been no basis
for recovery in that case. Only if someone had been injured
because the rug was unsafe for use would there have been any
basis for imposing strict liability in tort.
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort re-
covery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for eco-
nomic loss is not arbitrary... [but] rests.., on an under-
standing of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer
must undertake in distributing his products.5 9
The idea of strict liability for injuries to person or property is be-
coming more widely accepted. The extent of its acceptance is indicated
56 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
57 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
8 Comment, Manufacturer's Responsibility for Defective Products: Continuing Con-
troversy over the Law to be Applied, 54 CA.m. L. REv. 1681, 1689 (1966).
59 63 Cal. 2d at 17-18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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in Second Restatement of Torts in section 402A and the accompanying
comment:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller6 ° of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop-
erty is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The rule stated in this Section does not require any reliance
on the part of the consumer upon the reputation, skill, or
judgment of the seller who is to be held liable, nor any repre-
sentation or undertaking on the part of that seller. The seller
is strictly liable although, as is frequently the case, the con-
sumer does not even know who he is at the time of con-
sumption. The rule stated in this Section is not governed by
the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected
by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by
limitation to "buyer" and "seller" in those statutes. Nor is
the consumer required to give notice to the seller of his in-
jury within a reasonable time after it occurs, as is provided by
the Uniform Act. The consumer's cause of action does not
depend upon the validity of his contract with the person
from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by
any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between
the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and ac-
companying the product into the consumer's hands. In short,
"warranty" must be given a new and different meaning if it is
used in connection with this Section. It is much simpler to re-
gard the liability here stated as merely one of strict liability
in tort."1
60 In this section the word "Seller" includes "Manufacturer." RESTATEmENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965).
61 Id., comment m at 355-56. Other comments, e.g., at 348 and 349, also emphasize
that the meaning of § 402A is strict liability.
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Another aspect of the trend is that the definition of a "defect" con-
tinues to expand. The manufacturer may find himself liable for failure
to build in certain safety features, even if this is quite difficult to do
and even if the peril is obvious to the injured person. In Pike v. Frank
G. Hough Co., 62 an earthmoving machine called a paydozer backed up
and killed a workman. Because of a huge rear engine box, the driver
could not have seen a man six feet in height as far as 48 feet behind
the paydozer. The manufacturer was held liable for neglecting his
"duty" to reduce this hazard-even though rear-view mirrors project-
ing four feet from the sides of the cab would not completely eliminate
the blind area, and even though the hazard may have been obvious
to the workman.03
Also, the burden of proof concerning defects may be shifting some-
what.64 Instead of requiring the plaintiff to prove that a defect existed,
the defendant may sometimes be obliged to prove that a defect did not
exist. In one recent case, the plaintiff merely had to demonstrate that
a steel piler's mechanical fingers dropped its load so as to result in the
injury.0 5 Other parts of the production line, for example, the air com-
pression system, may have contained defects that caused the accident,
but the manufacturer of the piler was held liable. The necessity of
proving that his piler was not the defective component was in effect
placed on the manufacturer.
In the past few years, products liability law has also been extended
to another major product, namely, housing produced by large-scale
builders.66 As one writer suggests, it was paradoxical a few years ago
that so much protection was given to the buyer of a two dollar fountain
pen in comparison with the protection given to the man who put all
his savings into a house.67 Again, in this comparatively new applica-
tion, both implied warranty and strict liability under tort are in-
volved.68
62 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
03 The lower court granted a "nonsuit," thus favoring the defendant, but the Supreme
Court of California decided that the plaintiffs' evidence warranted a jury trial-that the
evidence was "sufficient to support a jury verdict in their (the plaintiffs) favor." Id. at
637.
64 21 STAN. L. REv. 1777, 1786 (1969).
65 Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (WV.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87
(8d Cir. 1969).
06 Comment, Extension of Strict Liability to the Construction and Sale of Buildings in
Oregon, 48 ORE. L. Rxv. 411 (1969); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The
Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CoRmuE L.Q. 835 (1967).
67 Id. at 835-36.
08 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes,
Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969). In the latter case, the court found
"no meaningful distinctions between ... mass production and sale of homes and the
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Along with the trend toward strict liability, there has been some
tendency to increase the size of the awards in cases of severe injuries
or multiple victims, reinforcing the effect of stricter liability. For in-
stance, awards in automobile accident litigation seem to have risen.
The dramatic examples, however, are the punitive damages awarded
in some of the drug cases. 69 Such damages are intended to punish, to
encourage the injured to sue by making it more rewarding, and
through these various effects to heighten the deterrence of potential
offenders.70 Note also that insurance coverage may be disallowed on
the grounds that it would defeat the aim of punishing particular of-
fenders.71 These too are relevant developments, because with them,
strict liability makes the neglect of safety features entail greater ex-
pected costs to producers than would otherwise be the case.
A factor that may work in the opposite direction is the expanded
reliance on liability insurance. Some people believe that this phe-
nomenon almost completely eliminates any tendency of the fault sys-
tem to deter producer negligence, since the insurance company pays
the bill.72 If so, expanded and perhaps modified insurance coverage
may also dilute the impacts of strict liability. The actual effects of
liability insurance depend partly on how sensitive premium charges,
coverage, and chances of cancellation are to the individual firm's (or,
mass production and sale of automobiles .... " 269 Cal. App. 2d at 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. at
752. There may be a distinction, however: it may be much more costly to apply products
liability law to the production of homes, which may be why the application has been
slow to appear.
69 The MER/29 cases bring out the potential significance of punitive damages. For
instance, see Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967). The defendants, several pharmaceutical firms, produced and distributed a drug
(MER/29) which seemed to be an effective treatment for arteriosclerosis, one of the
world's greatest killers. Unfortunately, the drug apparently turned out also to cause
cataracts of the eye. Court actions are still going on, but punitive awards as of 1967 were
said to total between V2 and 3/4 of a billion dollars There are many important and
unresolved issues, involving such matters as the amount of testing and experimentation
that one prefers to have before the marketing of new drugs, the type of information
and disclaimers that producers should issue, and the role that the Federal Drug Admin-
istration should play. But for present purposes the central point is that awards are
sometimes very high.
For a discussion of the special issues involved in the development and marketing of
drugs, see Rheingold, Products Liability-the Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18
RUTGEm L. Rlv. 947 (1964).
70 For information about these matters I am especially indebted to Barry G. West,
Some Contemporary Corporate Problems Concerning Punitive Damages (unpublished
paper submitted in satisfaction of the written requirements of the seminar on Legal Pro-
tection Against Hazardous Products and the Master of Law Degree, Harvard Law School,
March 15, 1967).
71 Northwestern Natl Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (1962).
72 Ehrenzweig, supra note 50, at 1440-41.
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to a lesser extent, the industry's) record concerning damages and law-
suits. If premiums, etc., are sensitive to bad records, then firms will
anticipate extra costs when they produce relatively risky products.
If not, or if the sensitivity occurs only at a few major threshold points,
there will be "ranges of product hazard" over which the threat of law-
suits may not affect the firm's costs. (This is not to say that the firm will
have no concern about safety. It must still sell the product, and an en-
terprise cannot survive if it tries to market rubber skillets or bottles of
beer that explode half the time.)
We cannot here determine just how sensitive the premiums and
cancellations are to a firm's lawsuits or just how much the gaps in cov-
erage affect each firm's decisions. Clearly there is some standardization
and insensitivity in insurance provisions, partly because many states
require some degree of uniformity, and partly because some degree is
simply economical.7 3 Partly due to the high cost of information and
because accident or actuarial records become obsolete as innovations
occur and product designs change, it would be quite expensive to
have insurance provisions infinitely adjustable or to gear premium
increases neatly to "defective" products and lawsuit costs. Because of
these factors, we can say that liability insurance may dilute the effects
of the trend toward making producers liable.7 4
C. Are These Developments Revolutionary?
Where do these trends affecting products liability leave us? There
have clearly been many moves toward producer liability, both under
tort and under warranty law. There has perhaps been a tendency to
make larger awards. These moves may have been partially offset (in
their impact on producers) by the growth of liability insurance. Still,
as noted before, strict liability does not mean that the manufacturer
or producer is liable for damages regardless of circumstances. First of
all, the product must contain a "defect," and therefore "the manufac-
turer's strict liability depends on what is meant by defective."75 Arsenic
in butter would be a defect, but cholesterol, while it may do harm,
would not be regarded as a defect. The courts recognize that the
availability of a product may provide more advantages than disad-
vantages, even though it can be misused or it may be "unavoidably
78 I am indebted to Professor Robert E. Keeton for discussing several of these issues
with me.
74 Liability insurance itself may have important effects on resource allocation and on
wealth distribution, but the subject here is the impact of the developments in products
liability, given the existence of insurance and other institutions.
75 Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REv. 363, 266 (1965).
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unsafe." Some writers draw the line at peculiar points-some seem to
feel that only the highest quality item does anyone more good than
harm. And the rationalizations are sometimes rather strange: hospitals
are not held liable when a patient gets hepatitis from a blood trans-
fusion because a transfusion is said to be a service rather than a
product, or because hospitals are regarded as "bourns of mercy" and
not as "profit-seeking vendors in the market place [like] General Foods,
General Motors ... ."6 Nonetheless, as Coase suggests, 77 the real
reasoning, perhaps unconscious, may well be that the benefits from the
decision are judged to outweigh the harm-that even risky merchan-
dise such as a blood transfusion offers gain that should be weighed
against the ill effects.
Producers may not be held liable if the "defect" poses hazards for
only a few customers instead of for everyone. If only a small percentage
of users develop allergic responses, the courts may regard the users,
rather than the product, as being defective.7 8 As is true in all deviation-
from-the-norm tests, there is no neat criterion here: if a mechanical
part ordinarily lasts three years, but the one in question failed in
two and one-half years and resulted in injuries to someone, was the
part defective? Should the producer be liable?
There are many problems, moreover, with proving that a defect
existed or that it was attributable to a particular producer in the chain
of component manufacturers, assemblers, or processors. The fact that
an accident occurred does not show that a defect was present. If the
user is clearly guilty of contributory negligence or if he knows of the
defect and uses the product anyway, he may be unable to recover. And,
according to Prosser, this inability to recover would be consistent with
both warranty and tort law.79
Thus, in a number of situations, there are still many uncertainties
about who would be liable. Neither producer nor consumer can pro-
ceed complacently by assuming that someone else will always be held
liable. These recent developments may be revolutionary from the
standpoint of the law, or in comparison with the slow pace of change
in earlier periods, or as harbingers of things to come. On balance,
though, it seems to me that the magnitude of the shift in liability
76 Id. at 368. Quotation is from Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp.,
12 Utah 2d 241, 243-44, 364 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1961). The court went on to say, "No hospital
gives green trading stamps . . . or a car for one having the lucky blood purchase order
number."
77 Coase, supra note 16, at 19-27, where he examines statements by such authorities as
Prosser and the language of several decisions in English and U.S. courts.
78 Traynor, supra note 75, at 369.
79 Prosser, supra note 36, at 839-40.
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assignment so far has not been dramatic. The main thing that has
happened lately is a further modest increase in the probability that
injured persons will be compensated by the producer.
III. POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
One future development that many envisage is simply the consolida-
tion and completion of the shift toward strict liability. Some of the
quotations in the preceding section indicate that a number of author-
ities believe that strict liability under tort will and should emerge.
Justice Traynor is among those who have suggested the extension of
such liability to physical damage to property (though still not to
pecuniary or economic losses arising because the purchased item's
quality falls short of the buyer's expectations): "The early cases limited
strict liability to recovery for physical injuries to the person, but
physical injury to property bears such close analogy to personal injury
that there is no reason for distinguishing them."8 10 Indeed, as Traynor
then notes, "The Second Restatement of Torts would impose strict
liability for physical damage to property as well as to persons." ' Some
have urged extension to bystanders 2 Some are hoping for improve-
ments in the rules governing choice of law in products liability cases,
which would somewhat reduce the uncertainties about the placement
of liability.8 3
Even if recent trends toward strict liability were consolidated and
extended, however, it would still not be a very dramatic change. The
crux of the matter would still be the necessity of proving the existence
80 Traynor, supra note 78, at 37S.
81 Id., citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
82 See Prosser, supra note 56, at 819-20.
83 See D. CAVERS, THE CHOiGE-oF-LA Rocass (1965); Weintraub, Choice of Law for
Products Liability: The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code and Recent Develop-
ments in Conflicts Analysis, 44 TExAs L. Ray. 1429 (1966).
The uncertainties can be great. When an airplane manufactured in one state is flown
by an airline whose main offices are in a second state, and the aircraft crashes in a third
state, killing a passenger domiciled in a fourth state, there is a problem of choosing
which state's law should apply. Present rules are sometimes said to yield predictability
about whether the law will be that of the place of contracting, place of sale, place of
performance, etc. But this is true only when the action is one based on contract (strict
tort liability would probably call for the law of the "place of the wrong"). Besides, pre-
diction is possible only after a particular accident has occurred. The applicable law is
scarcely any more predictable, therefore, than the place or nature of the accident itself.
Choice of law often leads to capricious and surprising outcomes that seem unrelated to
"justice." Many persons favor giving the courts more discretion to analyze the whole
situation and choose the state law (as long as it has some "reasonable relation" to the
accident) that would seem to yield the most equitable outcome in the particular circum-
stances. Extra discretion has its disadvantages, but some authorities evidently believe the
gains would outweigh the costs.
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of a "defect" or (and this may amount chiefly to different language) the
existence of a "duty" that was not fulfilled. As Prosser emphasizes, the
issues about proof, abnormal use (a form of contributory negligence),
intervening conduct, and knowledge of the defect (and therefore issues
about representations and perhaps even about disclaimers) in effect
still exist and relieve the producer of liability in many circumstances.8 4
Developments since Prosser's discussion-for example, the broader
concept of a defect, the occasional shifting of the burden of proof, the
higher probability of finding no defense in obviousness of peril-do
not seem to alter the situation greatly. 5 For these developments can-
not reveal just how far the producer must go to carry out his "duty,"
and these issues about proof, abnormal use, and so on will still bear
on decisions about whether a duty was neglected. Thus the full de-
velopment of strict liability under tort would simply go a bit further
to increase the chances that the producer will be held liable.
Some writers seem to have in mind more than strict tort liability,
however, for they recommend or foresee more comprehensive com-
pensation of victims than would occur under strict liability. One
writer explicitly supports the abolition of the requirement of a defect.
According to Cowan, "If this practice [applying strict liability as in
Henningsen] grows, plaintiff may next be required only to connect
up the injury with the product. He may not have to prove a defect.
When and if this happens we shall have taken another step on the
road toward making consumer's injuries into an equilibrium system,
where the important question is not who caused the injury, but how
shall the harm be repaired."8' 6 Numerous authors seem to have in mind
rather drastic shifts in the spreading or allocation of losses. "The ques-
tion central to the Santor-Seely dichotomy is whether the manufac-
turer may define the scope of his obligation, or whether the law should
impose upon him the duty to allocate the risk as best he can, irrespec-
tive of any agreement between consumer and manufacturer."87 Frank-
84 Prosser, supra note 36, at 824-48.
85 See Hill, How Strict Is Strict? Have the Walls of the Citadel Really Crumbled?, 32
TrF-xs B.J. 759 (1969). For developments concerning particular issues, see Boland, Strict
Liability in Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood, 23 ARu. L. Rv. 236 (1969), and
Note, Products Liability: Foreseeability of Unusual Uses of a Product Which Are Ac-
companied by Injury, 4 GA. L. REv. 164 (1969).
Page Keeton has urged that the producer should be liable if the product is sold
"under circumstances that would subject someone to an unreasonable risk." Keeton,
Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TExAs L. REv. 398, 409 (1970). But it
seems to me that essentially the same considerations would enter into deciding what was
"unreasonable:'
86 Cowan, supra note 53, at 1094.
87 Comment, supra note 58, at 1711.
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lin appears to think the future may hold more safety legislation or per-
haps social insurance plans: "Today's tort law is heading toward
protecting individuals from themselves .... [T]he fear was expressed
in Henningsen that even though the buyer knew in advance that he
was getting no protection (assuming no negligence liability) and that
presumably the price of the product was lower because of this exculpa-
tion, the buyer would not or could not obtain commensurate, or even
minimal, protection through private channels."18
Justice Traynor explicitly mentions some possibilities that go be-
yond strict liability:
The development of strict liability for defective products,
for industrial injuries covered by workmen's compensation,
and for injuries caused by ultrahazardous activities, presages
the abandonment of long-standing concepts of fault in acci-
dent cases. The significant innovations in products liability
may well be carried over to such cases. On the highways alone
injury and slaughter are not occasional events, but the order
of the day, and sooner or later there is bound to be more
rational distribution of their costs than is now possible under
the law of negligence....
Any system of enterprise liability or social insurance de-
signed to replace existing tort law as the means for compen-
sating injured parties should provide adequate but not undue
compensation. Only if reasonably adequate compensation is
assured can the law justify dosing traditional avenues of tort
recovery.8 9
This passage appears to suggest some sort of auto compensation
plan, 0 or perhaps a social insurance scheme, for products liability cases
in general. Such developments might have far-reaching consequences-
well beyond those of strict tort liability. The implications of some of
these more dramatic changes will be discussed in subsequent sections.9'
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS INDICATED BY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Let us try at this point to trace out the economic implications of
alternative arrangements regarding products liability. In writing for
88 Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. Rnv. 974, 1011 (1966).
89 Traynor, supra note 75, at 375-76.
90 The Keeton-O'Connell proposal is probably the most widely known auto compensa-
tion plan. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BAsic PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFiC VicTm
(1965).
91 Some of the authors cited, and many other persons, are probably thinking of ad-
ditional safety legislation-governmental constraints on the quality or design of products
-but for the most part safety legislation and its implications are beyond the scope of
the present paper.
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a variety of readers, I think it would be fruitless to plunge immediately
into using the jargon and concepts of economics. Dreary though it may
be, tracing out the basic notions of economics with the aid of arith-
metic examples is surely preferable to a discussion that would have
meaning for only a few readers. First, the basic ideas will be presented
in their starkest form; the complications and qualifications will be
considered afterward.
A. General Background92
To understand the economic implications of alternative policies, one
has to have clearly in mind the notions of cost and comparative ad-
vantage; and to see how much and how little economics can guide one
regarding policy, it is important to understand what is meant by
"economic efficiency" and "Pareto optimality." Although it is a great
oversimplification, let us confine our attention to three producers, each
capable of producing two commodities. Any two commodities or ser-
vices would illustrate the points, but let us label them automobiles
and penicillin since the use of these items has often resulted in in-
juries. As is usually the case, the three producers (called A, B, and C)
have different abilities to produce these items, as indicated in the
following schedules.
TABLE I
PRODUcTON-POsssmauTY Sc imi-E
(Units of each commodity that could be produced per time period)
Combined Schedule for
A B C the Three Producers
Peni- Peni- Peni- Peni-
Autos cillin Autos cillin Autos cillin Autos cillin
9 0 12 0 3 0 24 0
6 1 10 1 2 1 23 1
3 2 8 2 1 2 22 2
0 8 6 3 0 3 21 8
4 4 19 4
2 5 15 6
0 6 9 9
0 12
These schedules show the combinations of the two commodities that
each producer can produce-the largest amount of autos that each
can produce for any given quantity of penicillin he produces (or, al-
ternatively, the largest amount of penicillin that each can produce for
any given number of autos that he produces). For instance, if A de-
92 For a dear presentation of the central points here, see also A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN,
UNrLsrrY EcoNoMcs 163-95 (2d ed. 1967).
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votes all his time to producing autos, he can produce 9 per year; if
he produces 1 unit of penicillin, the time and resources left over will
permit him to produce only 6 autos; if he produces 2 units of penicillin
during the period, he can produce in addition only 3 autos; or by giv-
ing all his effort to the production of penicillin, he can produce 3 units.
Note that A has to sacrifice 3 autos whenever he wishes to produce
an extra unit of penicillin. The economist says that the marginal cost of
penicillin to A is 3 autos-that is, whatever must be sacrificed in order
to have an incremental or "marginal" unit of penicillin. Conversely,
the marginal cost of autos to A is 1/3 unit of penicillin; to increase his
output of autos by 3, he has to give up 1 unit of penicillin, or to
increase his output of autos by 1, he has to sacrifice I unit of penicil-
lin.
B, however, must give up only 2 autos to produce an extra unit of
penicillin, and has to sacrifice V2 unit of penicillin to produce an
additional car. To C the marginal cost of penicillin is I auto, and the
marginal cost of autos is 1 unit of penicillin. Note that B has an ab-
solute advantage over C in producing either autos or penicillin-he is
capable of producing 12 autos (if he devotes all his energies to that
output) or 6 units of penicillin (if he devotes all his effort to that
output), while the most that C can produce is 3 autos or 3 units of
penicillin. Yet C would have to sacrifice only 1 auto, while B would
have to give up 2 autos, to produce a unit of penicillin. According to
the economist's jargon, C has a comparative advantage in producing
penicillin, while B, relative to C, has a comparative advantage (as well
as an absolute advantage) in producing autos. This merely makes pre-
cise the common sense realization that, even if a lawyer is a better
typist than his secretary, she has a comparative advantage in typing
because his productivity in professional activities is so much greater
than his secretary's.
Given these production possibility schedules for A, B, and C, who
should produce autos and who should produce penicillin? If we want
to have the maximum output of one commodity, given whatever
amount of the other commodity is desired, we should always turn first
to the producer who has the comparative advantage in producing that
commodity. And for additional output of any commodity, we should
always turn to the producer who at that point has a comparative ad-
vantage (or, in other words, who can produce additional units at the
lowest marginal cost).
In the illustration, if people did not have any use for penicillin at
all, it would of course be desirable to have A, B, and C all produce only
autos, and they could turn out a total of 24 autos per period. Suppose
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now that 2 units of penicillin are desired. The efficient thing to do is
to turn to C, the low cost producer of penicillin. If he produces the
2 units of penicillin, only 2 autos must be sacrificed, and the community
can still have 22 autos as well as the 2 units of penicillin. If we turned
to B for the 2 units of penicillin, 4 autos would have to be sacrificed,
leaving total output at 20 autos and 2 units of penicillin. If we turned
to A for the 2 units of penicillin, we would sacrifice 6 autos, which
would put total output at 18 autos and 2 units of penicillin. By turn-
ing to C instead of B or A, total output can be larger. In that circum-
stance, someone can be made better off without making anyone else
worse off.
Suppose 6 units of penicillin are desired. C's maximum output is 3,
so for the additional 3 units we must turn to another producer. The
one to whom we should turn is the next-lowest-cost producer-the
one who at that point has a comparative advantage in producing pen-
icillin. As noted earlier, the marginal cost of penicillin if A produces
it is 3 autos, while the marginal cost if B produces it is 2 autos. B has
the comparative advantage in producing the extra 3 units of penicillin.
By turning to him, we can have the 6 units of penicillin and still have
15 autos (9 produced by A and 6 by B), while if we turned to A instead
of B, we would end up with 6 units of penicillin (produced by C and
A) and only 12 autos (produced by B).
If we trace out the maximum number of autos that can be produced
for each quantity of penicillin that might be desired, we derive what
the economist calls the combined production-possibility schedule (parts
of which are indicated in Table 1) or the output combinations that
constitute "economic efficiency" or the "set of efficient points." At one
of these efficient points, it is impossible to expand the output of autos
without reducing the output of penicillin (or to expand the output
of penicillin without reducing the output of autos). At an inefficient
point, it is possible to expand the output of one commodity without
reducing the output of another. At an inefficient point there is thus
some kind of adjustment that can be mutually advantageous-a deal
that some persons have an incentive to make because they could them-
selves be better off without anyone else objecting.
Let us turn back, for example, to the situation in which someone in
the community was willing to pay the cost of 2 units of penicillin.
Assume that this person is willing to pay 7 autos for the 2 units (but
only 1 auto for a third unit). Any one of the producers would find
it advantageous to produce the 2 units of penicillin. A would have to
reduce his output by 6 autos but could sell the 2 units of penicillin
for 7 autos. (In this simple economy autos serve as money, and people
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have stocks of this money for trading purposes quite apart from this
year's output.) B and C could produce the 2 units of penicillin by
sacrificing only 4 and 2 autos respectively. Suppose the buyer actually
got together with A and offered 7 autos, which, as noted earlier, would
be an inefficient solution. If getting together and negotiating involved
zero costs, C would soon offer to sell the 2 penicillin to the buyer for
between 2 and 4 automobiles. He would not sell at a price of less than
2 automobiles, because he has to give up 2 automobiles to produce 2
units of penicillin. He could not charge more than 4 autos, for B
would then find it advantageous to make the sale, eliminating any gain
for C. At any price between 2 and 4 autos for 2 units of penicillin, C
and the buyer would both be better off than they would be if the
'buyer bought penicillin from A.93 They could even arrange to give
1 auto to A, and leave no one worse off than before. The reason is
simply that there are 4 extra autos to be shared among C, the buyer,
and A. Thus, voluntary exchange takes the community to an "efficient
point"-in this instance, to the point where the community's total
output is 22 autos and 2 penicillin units rather than 18 autos and 2
penicillin.
This is quite important to remember. If the economy is at an in-
efficient point, there is an opportunity for a mutually advantageous
deal. This will shift each output to whatever producers have a com-
parative advantage in producing it and thus yield a net increment in
total output. This increment can be parceled out by the bargain so
as to make the bargainers better off without making anyone else worse
off. This possibility provides the incentive to make the deal. The
existence of a mutually advantageous trade implies, it should be noted,
that the gains exceed the transaction costs-that is, the costs connected
with the trade. These include the costs 4 of gathering information about
the products and about where to buy them, of negotiating and drawing
up contracts, and of enforcing the contracts (including the implied
property rights to keep and use whatever the parties traded for).
Such bargains will occur if the transaction costs are covered (and if
people make use of voluntary exchange rather than coercion). If the
bargaining costs would exceed the gains, there could be no increment
in output to parcel out, and no deal would be effected. In that event,
though, the so-called "inefficient solution" (in our example, buying
from A so that output is 18 autos and 2 penicillin units) is the best that
93 C and the buyer would also be better off, and total output higher, than if the buyer
purchased from B, since B could produce the 2 penicillin only by sacrificing 4 autos.
94 As will be noted later, there may also be psychic costs of making a direct open deal,
if exposing the terms would make it distasteful in most persons' eyes.
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can be achieved through voluntary exchange, that is, in a way which
assures that no one is being made worse off.95 This inefficient solution
may in fact be the most efficient attainable solution. The government
might find some way to reduce the bargaining costs, but whether it
can do so is difficult to ascertain, because the government's action is
almost certain to involve compulsion for some persons, and one can-
not be sure what the true costs of the action are.
Of course the government might simply direct that 22 autos and 2
penicillin units be produced, and thus set production at an efficient
point; but it should be kept in mind that the government too would
encounter information, decision-making, and enforcement costs. With
production no longer organized by voluntary exchange, we would lose
the information generated by markets and the incentives provided by
exchange opportunities to acquire information, identify favorable deals,
and take action. Government would find some slippage between good
intentions and actual outcomes. It might decree that producers make
22 autos and 2 penicillin units, yet actually obtain 15 autos and 1
penicillin.
Moreover-another background item for later use-this possibility
of government decree instead of voluntary exchange highlights a dis-
tinction between the set of "efficient points" and a more restricted
kind of efficiency that the economist calls "Pareto optimality." (This
rather awkward term is named after a nineteenth century social scien-
tist who figured out this concept after grappling with the question:
"vhat does one mean by optimality for a group?") To keep the mean-
ing of this term within reach, one might think of it as "the results, or
simulated results, of voluntary exchange." As the discussion and
Table 1 have indicated, there are many efficient points, not just one.
The government could say, "Autos are bad for you, and production
next year will be zero autos and 12 units of penicillin." That would
certainly be one of the "efficient points," for there would be no way to
expand the output of autos without sacrificing some penicillin. But it
might be an output combination that had little relationship to the
preferences of many consumers and little similarity to the output
combination to which voluntary exchange would lead. Starting with
a particular distribution of wealth, voluntary exchange would lead
to one particular efficient point-say, 22 autos and 2 penicillin (or
rather one particular most-efficient-attainable point). Starting from a
different distribution of wealth, voluntary exchange would lead to
a different efficient point-say, 15 autos and 6 penicillin. If I had
95 Only voluntary exchange can assure that no one is worse off and that the informa-
tion about relative values is correct. The use of compulsion leaves this in doubt.
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considerable wealth, I might be willing to pay a great deal for autos
and not much for extra penicillin, while if you had that wealth you
might prefer to trade a great deal for extra penicillin but relatively
little for extra autos. These trading preferences would help determine
where we ended up on the combined production-possibility. schedule
in Table 1.
Thus there are two related but not identical concepts of efficiency-
"economic efficiency," in which no output can be expanded without
reducing some other output, and "Pareto optimality"-particular effi-
cient points to which voluntary exchange would lead, and at which
no person can be made better off (as he himself sees his well-being)
without making someone else worse off (as he himself sees his well-
being).
The same principles described above with respect to autos and
penicillin apply to other outputs. They apply to intermediate outputs
in the production process, such as windshields and tires that are com-
ponents of the automobiles. Simply substitute "windshields" and
"tires" for "autos" and "penicillin" in Table 1. Voluntary exchange
will put the production of each in the hands of producers having a
comparative advantage in producing each item. Or, substitute "infor-
mation" and "other goods" for "autos" and "penicillin." If the travel
agent can produce travel "information" at a lower sacrifice of "other
goods," that is, at a lower marginal cost, than you and I, it will pay
us to make a mutually advantageous deal: you and I hire him to
compile information in a central location; he hires us to produce
other goods; and we split the net increment in the value of total
output. If consumers can unearth the information about the way to
use a hammer at lower cost than the hammer manufacturer can pro-
vide it, the manufacturer will hire the consumer to get the informa-
tion (for example, he lowers the price a nickel instead of printing
instructions). Or, to look at the other side of the coin, the consumer
induces the manufacturer to leave this information acquisition in the
hands of the consumer; he does this by refusing to pay enough extra
for hammers with instructions to cover the cost of printing the in-
structions. In effect, the manufacturer can make a greater profit with-
out the instructions than with them.
If there were zero transaction costs, and if people eschewed the use
of coercion or interference with voluntary exchanges, it would not
matter, as far as resource allocation is concerned, how the legal rights
or liabilities were initially assigned, that is, whether the purchaser or
the manufacturer was liable for injuries and damages. The classic
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analysis of this matter is that of Ronald Coase. 6 There has been some
debate about whether Coase's conclusion applies to the long run.97
One might think, for example, that manufacturer liability would re-
duce the industry's profits, causing resources in the long run to move
elsewhere. If this was inefficient, however, some "gravy" could be
obtained by bringing about the correct allocation of resources. It
would pay some persons, if transaction costs were zero, to make deals
that would do this. Presumably consumers, by making side payments,
would hire entrepreneurs to stay in the right industries. There now
seems to be general agreement that Coase is right if one accepts the
basic assumptions.98
Perhaps it should be stressed here, as well as later, that these as-
sumptions are fairly heroic. We know that, like any other assumptions
used to simplify and think about reality, they do not hold in the real
world. There are transaction costs (indeed it is difficult to visualize
such a world and to adhere to the assumption just for the purpose of
analysis). Furthermore, many persons are unwilling to abide by the
results of voluntary exchange. Most of us have a taste, at least occa-
sionally, for using coercion or for interfering with other persons'
choices. These points will be discussed more fully later. For the
moment I wish merely to stress that, as Coase recognized, the situa-
tion he discussed is simply a point of departure (as is the auto-peni-
cillin example). But it pays (I assert) to understand the oversimplified
situation before trying to make judgments about the more complex
ones.
Consider another perhaps unconventional output-risk bearing.
If my business is "wildcatting" for oil or dealing in second mortgages
and I find the risks sufficiently distasteful, I will sell off the assets and
rights involved to some vigorous person who finds the risks less dis-
tasteful. That is, we make a mutually advantageous deal in which he
takes over the risk bearing, and I shift into some other business that
I regard as preferable. Voluntary exchange puts the risk bearing on
the shoulders of the person with a comparative advantage in bearing it.
Consider finally one of the principal commodities to which this
report pertains-"injury prevention." Let us consider the hypothetical
9 Coase, supra note 16, at 1. See also Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of
Property Rights, 7 J. LAW & ECON. 11 (1964).
97 Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs,
78 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1965).
98 Nutter, The Coase Theorem on Social Cost: A Footnote, 11 J. LAv & ECON. 503
(1968); Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Com-
ment, 11 J. Lmv & EcoN. 67 (1968).
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production-possibility schedules of Auto Drivers and Auto Producers,
using "broken arms prevented" as one commodity, and "other goods
worth $100 per package" as the other commodity. By being more
careful, using buses more and cars less, choosing safer but more time-
consuming routes, fastening safety belts, or reducing the frequency
with which teen-age children are allowed to drive, auto drivers can
produce "broken arms prevented," but it consumes time and reduces
their output of other goods. By installing various safety features, such
as governors that would keep speeds down to 25 miles per hour, auto
manufacturers too can produce "broken arms prevented," but it would
consume resources and reduce their output of additional or improved
automobiles (a maximum speed of 25 miles per hour would reduce
other people's outputs too).
TABLE 2
MoRE PRODUCrON-PossmILrry Scmmurs
(Combinations that could be produced per time period)
Auto Drivers Auto Manufacturers Combined Schedule
Other Goods Other Goods Other Goods
Broken (Packages Broken (Packages Broken (Packages
Arms Pre- Worth Arms Pre- Worth Arms Pre- Worth
vented $100 Each) vented $100 Each) vented $100 Each)
5 0 4 0 9 0
4 1 3 3 8 3
3 2 2 5 7 5
0 3 0 6 6 6
5 7
3 8
0 9
In this example we have departed from the assumption of con-
stant marginal cost for each type of producer. Here it is assumed that,
starting from zero output of broken arms prevented, drivers can pro-
duce 3 by sacrificing only 1 unit of "other goods," only 1 more by
sacrificing a second unit of other goods, and only 1 more by sacrificing
all other goods. In other words, the first few broken arms prevented
could be produced by exercising moderate care, but additional units
require greater and more costly adaptations. Manufacturers, in this
imaginary instance, could produce 2 broken arms prevented by sacri-
ficing only 1 unit of other goods, one additional prevention by
sacrificing 2 units of other goods, and a fourth prevention per period
only by sacrificing 3 more units of other goods. Initially, it is assumed,
simple safety features yield improved results, but to reduce the hazard
further and further, the autos must be made quite cumbersome and
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costly. How much damage prevention (broken arms prevented) is de-
sired in total depends upon the amount of other goods one believes
should be sacrificed to reduce injuries. One might prefer leaving
this up to the bids of individuals, or one might prefer to interfere
with individuals' choices and have, say, the majority adopt a rule. For
the moment, in any event, our concern is with this question: who
should produce whatever output of broken arms prevented is desired?
Suppose the community is willing, as shown through either market
bids or the political process, to pay the cost of only 3 broken arms
prevented. For that amount, if we wish to maximize total output, we
should turn to the auto drivers. And, if negotiation costs are low,
drivers will hire manufacturers not to install safety features (or manu-
facturers would bribe drivers to produce the injury prevention).
Transaction costs might be low in this instance if the matter were left
to the market, for negotiation would consist of drivers being unwill-
ing to pay manufacturers a price that would cover the safety features,
since the drivers themselves could produce 3 broken arms prevented
at a lower sacrifice. By having the drivers produce this amount, there
would be an extra 2 units of "other goods" that drivers and manufac-
turers could share.
Suppose next that the community wished to live less dangerously
and showed a willingness, either through market bids or the political
process, to buy 5 broken arms prevented per period. According to
Table 2, the manufacturers should be induced to produce the extra 2
broken arms prevented, because they could do so at a cost of 1 unit of
other goods, putting total output at 5 broken arms prevented and 7
"other goods." If drivers produce all 5 broken arms prevented, total
output of "other goods" drops to 6. This is an inefficient point, and
a mutually advantageous deal can be made. If information acquisition
is cheap, drivers will soon see that it would be economical to hire the
manufacturers to produce safer automobiles (by paying them the
higher cost), and manufacturers will soon see that it would be profit-
able to hire drivers to produce more other goods instead of the 4th
and 5th broken arms prevented (by offering to sell them safer auto-
mobiles).
The above instance involved a special relationship between the two
producers. One was the seller of a product, the other was the consumer
of the product, and the use of the product resulted in injuries to the
consumer. The same principles hold, however, if no special relation-
ship exists. For "Auto Drivers," we could substitute "Third Parties
Whose Arms Are Broken When Autos Are Used," or "Piano Tuners
Whose Ears and Businesses Are Damaged by the Noise Made by Truck-
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ing Firms."9 9 Suppose we were at an inefficient point: "Third Parties"
or "Piano Tuners" were in fact taking steps to reduce injuries when
Auto Manufacturers (who sell their product to various users including
trucking firms) had a comparative advantage in producing that much
injury reduction. That is, by modifying the product, the manufacturer
could provide this damage reduction at a lower cost. If transaction
costs were zero, it would pay the Third Parties or Piano Tuners to
make a deal-to cease the costly steps they were taking (for instance,
avoidance of major streets by Third Parties, or construction of sound-
proof shops by Piano Tuners) and hire the Auto Manufacturers to
make the modifications that would reduce the injuries. Alternatively,
the Auto Manufacturers would offer to sell this new output, the desig-
nated amount of damage reduction, to the Third Parties or Piano
Tuners at prices lower than the latter were currently paying, and yet
make a profit on the deal.
Thus the principles involved are the same ones that applied when
the two producers of injury reduction had a seller-customer relation-
ship (though, as will be seen later, the magnitude of negotiation costs
may vary greatly with these different relationships). Also, of course
the principles involved are the same ones discussed initially with ref-
erence to producers of autos and penicillin. I have belabored these
matters because they are so essential in trying to see certain implica-
tions of alternative products liability arrangements. In summary, if
we wish to reach an efficient point, we should seek arrangements in
which each output is produced by those having a comparative ad-
vantage in producing it. If transaction costs were zero, voluntary ex-
change could lead to a particular efficient point, depending upon the
initial wealth distribution. But we must turn now to some of the
complications (including the fact that logic does not compel one to
prefer economic efficiency or Pareto optimality over all other situa-
tionsl).
1. Implications of Transaction Costs. Unfortunately, even if we
could agree on economic efficiency as a goal, the best arrangement of
liability is not completely clear when there are transaction costs. In
many instances these costs not only exist but are large. Consider the
reduction of injuries and damages caused by the noise of autos and
trucks. For the sake of brevity I shall call this output noise abatement.
Voluntary exchange does not lead the economy to what would be an
efficient point in the absence of negotiation costs. Almost everyone-
not only piano tuners-would attach value to noise abatement. In the
89 Although some of these examples stray to some extent from the category of "products
liability" toward other types of liability cases, they serve to bring out the relevant points.
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aggregate they would presumably be willing to sacrifice quite a bit
to induce manufacturers to design quieter vehicles (and to induce
users to drive more quietly). Bargains would lead to the production
of noise abatement by the parties having a comparative advantage in
its production, taking the economy toward an efficient point. But
negotiation costs are high enough to prevent much exchange: with-
out a market it is extremely expensive for people to get together and
find out how much in total they would pay for various increments in
noise abatement. For this particular output, it would be costly to ex-
clude "free riders" from using the product without paying, costly to
enforce contracts between the individuals who bought noise abate-
ment and the drivers and auto manufacturers who were to supply
noise abatement, and therefore costly to determine how much the
users would be willing to pay. Even apart from the difficulty of ex-
cluding non-payers, it would be extremely expensive to negotiate
millions of contracts between the various parties affected, particularly
since autos and trucks move about among localities, producing the
noise in diverse, unpredictable locations. How much simpler it would
be if each person could go to the store and buy whatever number of
cans of noise abatement he desired.
Should one throw up his hands and say: We must be at the most
efficient attainable point, since because of these transaction difficulties
further deals cost more than the results are worth to the individuals
affected? The answer, unfortunately, is not clear. Even if it is too
costly for voluntary groups to form and make further bargains, we
belong to another group, government, and, even if my objective is
economic efficiency, I may without being illogical prefer to have
government intervene. By using some compulsion, a governmental
unit can take action, requiring automobile manufacturers and drivers
(or piano tuners and other sufferers) to make certain adaptations.
Government could provide for punishment, through civil or criminal
proceedings, if the rules were violated. In contemplating such a step
each of us has to make a personal judgment about the gains and costs,
in terms of reaching an efficient point (and in terms of his own utility
function). Personal judgments have to be made because, with infor-
mation about the consequences being expensive and with some com-
pulsion and no market, the costs and gains are far from dear.
In some instances of intervention, for example, requiring mufflers
and making people liable for "unreasonable nuisances," most people
agree that the gains outweigh the costs. In other instances, such as
requiring silent engines or making women liable for the distress they
inflict on others by wearing maxi-skirts, most people agree that the
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costs would outweigh the gains. In many instances, however, disagree-
ment exists and is not necessarily illogical-even in terms of reaching
an efficient point-because accurate information is so expensive and
personal judgments are involved. The most that economic analysis
can do to help is to try to provide better information (whenever the
prospective gains from this activity are judged to exceed the costsl).
This general conclusion applies, unfortunately, to the policy sug-
gestions pertaining to products liability. If there were zero transaction
costs, it would not matter as far as economic efficiency is concerned
(though it would matter from the standpoint of each person's concep-
tion of fairness) whether producers or consumers were required to bear
the damages. Ensuing bargains would assign each increment of injury
prevention to the party having a comparative advantage in producing
it, and would take us toward an efficient point. Information, coitract-
ing, and policing costs are not zero, however, and there will be room
for disagreement about whether particular forms of government inter-
vention would bring improvements or "disimprovements."
2. Is Economic Efficiency or Pareto Optimality Good? Thus far, the
discussion has assumed that we agree upon either economic efficiency-
maximum output of each product, given the outputs of the others-or
Pareto optimality-the particular efficient point to which voluntary
exchange would lead starting from a particular distribution of
wealth-as our objectives. Are these good things which we can agree
upon as objectives? Although it seems plausible that we should wish
to maximize output, there is no reason that all individuals should
agree upon economic efficiency or Pareto optimality as the supreme
objective.
First, economic efficiency must be defined either in a static sense-
with tastes, information and technology considered to be given-or in
a rather vague imprecise sense, in which the outputs include the pro-
duction of information, taste changes, and technological advances. If
defined in the latter sense, the production of knowledge and improved
technologies are probes into the unknown; one cannot define the un-
known outputs or the costs and gains from steps to produce them; and
therefore one cannot satisfactorily define the set of efficient points. If
economic efficiency is defined in the static sense, on the other hand, it
may well be sensible to sacrifice some of that kind of efficiency for the
sake of advances in knowledge and technology.100 Most people feel
that some form of patent law to shelter inventors from competition
100 Demsetz reminds us of this in Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12
J. LAW & EcoN. 1, 19-20 (1969). See also McKean & Minasian, On Achieving Pareto Op-
timality-Regardess of Cost, 5 WEsmanR ECON. J. 14 (1966).
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is desirable, and many people feel that a modest degree of monopoly
power to shelter other innovators is desirable. In both situations, eco-
nomic efficiency in the static sense is being sacrificed for the sake of
technological development. In connection with products liability, one
might approve making unsafe products more (less) expensive than
voluntary exchange would make them in order to stimulate research
on how to make safer products (or how to use products more safely).
Or one might approve sheltering the inventor of safer products to
stimulate such inventions, even though dissemination of this safer
design to other producers was retarded.
Second, if we consider those particular efficient points that are
Pareto optimal, they are not necessarily ones that you and I could
agree upon as objectives. Voluntary exchange leads to a point where
no one can be made better off as he sees his well-being without making
someone else worse off as he sees his well-being. In other words each
person is allowed to decide what trades he wishes to make. Reaching
a Pareto-optimal point implies letting each person decide what is good
for him. To a very tolerant person (or to a far-sighted person who is
worried about the possible repercussions if his group uses the political
process to tell others what is good for them), this objective may be
appealing. But all of us are accustomed to deciding what is good for
children, and most of us are perfectly willing to decide occasionally
what is good for other adults, even if their behavior will not have any
"tangible" spillover effects on us. Thus we are tempted to prescribe
what kinds of literature people should not read, what they should not
drink, and what risks they should not be allowed to assume. The
choices of other individual's sometimes cause us pain, even if they do
not affect us in any physical way; and logic does not compel individuals
to prefer policies that would take the economy toward Pareto-optimal
efficient points. 10 1 If logic does not compel one individual to prefer
Pareto optimality, it does not compel a majority of voters to so prefer.
Third, one may reject Pareto optimality-that is, simulation of the
results of voluntary exchange-because he attaches value to a particu-
lar decision-making procedure, such as majority rule, or to some un-
conventional output that is not included in our usual conception of
product possibilities, such as cohesiveness or social stability. Like the
other possible reasons for rejecting Pareto optimality, this considera-
101 Some have redefined Pareto optimality to allow for "interdependence of utility
functions" or tastes for interfering with the choices of others, but this yields a new type
of boundary that has ambiguous properties and gives little operational guidance. Thus,
Pareto optimality-no matter what items are counted as outputs-can help one think
about criteria and the effects of policies but cannot give specific guidance.
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tion may explain why some persons prefer product liability arrange-
ments that are not conducive to economic efficiency (narrowly con-
ceived).
Fourth, quite apart from the preceding points, any individual may
prefer an inefficient point to an efficient one if he believes he can twist
the distribution of wealth in the direction he desires at less transaction
costs (to him) than he would incur if he tried to do it through an overt
tax or subsidy. Consider the minimum wage, which makes it relatively
expensive for the employer to hire workers with low productivity (for
example, handicapped, old, teen-age, poorly educated, inexperienced,
or "undesirable" workers). Employers will find it economical to sub-
stitute, to some extent, skilled labor or machines for the low-produc-
tivity workers. This process increases the demand for skilled labor and
certain machines, raising their rates of hire, and benefiting the owners
of these resources at the expense of the handicapped workers (or, if the
handicapped are given relief, at the expense of the general taxpayer).
Skilled laborers or machinery producers may like the minimum wage,
even though it puts the economy at an inefficient point.
Why don't these laborers or producers strike a bargain with the un-
skilled that is mutually advantageous? If the handicapped workers
were allowed to work, there would be an increment in output that
could be shared among skilled laborers, machinery producers, for-
merly unemployed workers, and taxpayers-making everyone better
off. Why don't these groups get together, have the minimum wage law
repealed, and arrange either a contractual split of the extra output,
or taxes and subsidies that would take part of the gains away from the
handicapped (or the taxpayers, if they now finance less relief), and
restore the rewards accruing to the skilled workers and machinery
producers? The answer is, of course, that transaction costs are too high.
This deal would even involve psychic costs, because few would have
the gall to urge overtly such a bargain with the handicapped. In ad-
dition, it would require enormous resources to go through the political
bargaining involved in repealing such a law and the political or con-
tractual negotiations involved in recapturing much of the gains. The
skilled worker's preferred course of action, therefore, is to support
the minimum wage law (and convince himself that his intention is to
help the poor). As before, if an individual can feel this way without
being illogical, there is nothing surprising about a majority feeling
this way.
This point is important with respect to products liability. A person
may understandably prefer some "deep pocket" (that is, "soak the
rich") arrangement even if it sacrifices efficiency, because transaction
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costs might make it more expensive to him to effect the same wealth
distribution through some arrangement that was consistent with
economic efficiency. Incidentally, despite the selfish attitude depicted
in my minimum wage example, one may attach great value to affecting
wealth distribution in an altruistic way; a person who does not stand
to benefit may attach value to a more equitable distribution of wealth
or to a bonus for innocent bystanders who are injured. Whatever re-
distributions of wealth one may regard as fair or desirable, he may
logically judge that he can obtain these redistributions at lower cost
to him by advocating a measure that impairs economic efficiency than
by pressing for a package of measures that would not reduce economic
efficiency.
Moreover, it appears that a major consideration pushing the courts
toward strict liability has been concern for fairness or equity. Advo-
cates of the "deep pocket" doctrine seem to believe that other conse-
quences of assigning liability are not as important as putting the
burden on those having the greater ability to pay. Repeatedly one
encounters the following sort of statement: "The cost of an injury
and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune
to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as
a cost of doing business."'0 2 The same consideration underlies some
of the opposition to strict liability: "General Motors in its role as
a consumer of automotive parts hardly needs absolute liability in tort
to pass on the risk of loss to a smaller vendor of component parts."'103
There has been less concern about the possible effects of revised
liability assignment on the efficiency of resource allocation.
While confessing to the absence of a generally valid criterion of
optimum policy, I might add a word about the role of prices in
measuring outputs. In the first hypothetical example, I used physical
outputs, autos and penicillin. On these circumstances the measure-
ment of cost is dear. As soon as I proceeded to a slightly more complex
situation-"broken arms prevented" and "packages of other goods
worth $100"-I had to introduce a package or aggregate in which
prices served as weights. The cost of a broken arm prevented was so
many packages worth $100-say, two cameras at $30 each and two
electric blankets at $20 each. If one approves the particular mixture
of voluntary exchange and government intervention that results in
102 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring). Or see Prosser's views in IHANDBOOK OF Tm LAw or TORTS 22
(3d ed. 1964).
103 Comment, supra note 58, at 1714.
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these prices, then he approves their use as weights. If some individuals
do not approve of this mixture, they need not approve of these weights
and, therefore, of the measure of marginal costs. In that case people
can disagree endlessly about what is efficient in terms of their particu-
lar "utility functions" or their particular concepts of a "social welfare
function." Logic does not then compel different individuals to agree
on a criterion; in fact it compels the group to be at sea without a
rudder (until the costs of disagreement induce them to agree upon
some procedure or criterion).
Simply stated, there is no inherently correct criterion of public
policy regarding products liability or anything else. Blum and Kalven
are right when they say:
In the situation in which his [the economist's] analysis is most
refreshing [where zero transaction costs exist], the economist
tells us that the liability issue is not worth arguing about... ;
and in the other situation, where he stresses that the legal rule
does affect the allocation of resources, his analysis at best
yields indecisive clues as to the proper answer.10
3. Where Does This Leave Us? Although economic analysis can
yield only indecisive dues as to the proper policies, this aid should not
be discarded casually. After all, none of the sciences can do more to
assist public policy. Chemistry and physics can only provide informa-
tion-indecisive clues-bearing on certain decisions; they cannot tell
one what ought to be done. Yet the information they provide is often
important to anyone trying to choose among alternative courses of
action. There is no escape from making personal judgments-about
uncertain consequences of actions and the importance or value of
those consequences. But information can help. Economic analysis can
indicate at least the direction of certain effects of alternative products
liability arrangements.
The principal basis for predicting effects of policies is the econo-
mist's basic tool-the downward sloping demand curve. This tool
says simply that, the more expensive an item or action is, the less of
it individuals will demand. Or, alternatively, the less one must sacri-
fice to have a unit of an action or commodity, the more of that action
or commodity one will decide he needs. Non-economists often doubt
this proposition. Without reflecting about the matter very much, they
conclude that an individual or a group needs a particular unique
quantity of water or classrooms or penicillin or gasoline. They ap-
104 W. BLUm & H. KALVEN, JR., PUBLIC LAW PERSPnECIMS ON A PRIVATE LAw PROBLEM:
AuTo COENSATION PLANS 65 (1965).
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patently doubt that people can substitute other things for such ser-
vices. Yet other things can be substituted in order to find preferred
positions, even though the process may involve subtle or complex adap-
tations. If the cost of gasoline went up to fifty cents per gallon in the
United States, people would eliminate a few marginal trips, use car
pools a bit more, substitute some bus and air travel for automobile
trips, use delivery services more, shift in some instances to smaller ve-
hicles that used less fuel per mile. If the cost went up to two dollars
per gallon, automobile manufacturers would find it profitable to re-
design engines, drivers would calculate their routes more carefully,
and businesses would use rail shipments and make numerous other
adjustments. If the cost went up to ten dollars per gallon, locational
patterns would gradually be affected, and cities might even become
rapid transit cities rather than sprawled out automobile cities.105
Similarly, if products liability laws make a type of product or action
more expensive, people will find ways to take less of that item and
substitute others. I recognize that many people doubt this proposition
where an action already involves as a cost the risk of death or injury.
For instance, it is often contended that a financial burden to be borne
by the careless driver or careless user of a product would do nothing
to deter his lack of caution because the threat of injury or death or,
in some instances, criminal punishment, would already provide the
maximum deterrent effect.106 Who is going to be careless if the result
would be injury? Who would be any less careless if the result would be
injury plus a financial penalty? I believe that those who make this
contention are often thinking of the deterrent as being a 100 per cent
probability of death or serious injury. What one realistically faces when
he is a little less careful, however, is a relatively small increase in the
probability of injury or criminal punishment, and we constantly trade
small increases in the probability of catastrophe for other things that
we want. Most of us sometimes cross busy streets at dusk or drive cars
in rainy weather, accepting a higher probability of being killed in
exchange for a saving of time or some other desirable good. Small in-
creases in the probability of death or injury do not seem to be "maxi-
mum deterrents." If one adds a financial cost to a small increase in the
probability of being killed, it may be a significant increase in the total
cost. If one adds a one in a hundred chance of losing two hundred
105 Even the popularity of miniskirts in Britain was partly a response to the law of
demand (and in part a subsequent change in tastes): miniskirts were relatively inexpensive
because Britain's 12% sales tax did not apply (until November 1, 1968) to skirts shorter
than 24 inches from hem to waistband.
106 See, e.g., L. GREN, TRAYric ViariMs: Tor" LAw AN INsuRamc 95 (1958).
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dollars in the form of higher insurance premiums to a one in a hun-
dred chance of having an arm broken, it may be a significant addition
to cost.
Since most of our decisions involve small changes in the probability
of serious injury, there is no reason that the law of demand should
not apply, that is, that extra costs should not deter. The magnitude of
the response will depend on circumstances; it can be determined only
by observing the facts, and none of us knows with certainty the elas-
ticity of such responses. But the general principle, one of the few
tested propositions we have, applies: the more expensive a careless ac-
tion is made, the less of that action will be taken; and the less expensive
the careless action is made, the more of the action one should expect.
This theorem of the sloping demand curve is the basic tool that I will
use in seeking the implications of products liability arrangements. The
analysis cannot reveal what ought to be done in any ultimate sense,
but it can indicate some relevant consequences of moving from or
toward producer liability without fault.
Most people would regard these consequences as being relevant
simply because intuition suggests that behavioral changes resulting
from a policy are likely to be pertinent. In a technical sense the reason
is probably as follows: while few persons regard economic efficiency in
the sense described above as their overriding objective or criterion,
most of us have enough to gain from this kind of efficiency to keep it in
mind as one of our important objectives. Congressional debates and
hearings suggest that congressmen do give some weight to economic
efficiency, to market prices and, therefore, to voluntary exchange and
Pareto optimality (though they would not use such a term!). They do
not have in mind the precise technical meaning of efficiency, yet the
imprecise concepts they do have in mind certainly appear to be re-
lated to the technical concept. The weight placed on efficiency by
congressmen strongly suggests that most voters-most persons in the
society-attach some value to economic efficiency. They are willing to
trade some efficiency for other objectives (for instance, fairness) when
it is too expensive to bargain for efficiency plus the other objectives,
but they are not willing to forget about economic efficiency entirely.
For these reasons, the policy consequences that economics can trace out
are relevant not merely because they are among the consequences but
because they are consequences that most persons feel are important.
B. More Specific Issues: Consequences of Making Various Groups
Liable
With the preceding discussion as background, we can ask in a more
systematic fashion: what are some of the important consequences of
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having liability assigned in various ways? We shall examine a spectrum
of possibilities from customer liability without fault to producer or
taxpayer liability without fault.
To begin, what would be the consequences of complete caveat emp-
tor-of having customers watch out for themselves and pay the losses
that occur in using a product?0 7 This arrangement would lead to
economic efficiency-to the production of safety features, caution in
using products, etc., by those parties having a comparative advantage
in producing each item-if there were zero negotiation and enforce-
ment costs.' 0 8 Purchasers of products would hire producers to reduce
product hazards and "bribe themselves" to exercise care as long as
these actions paid. What about injured third parties? If buyers of items
were liable, they would modify their product selection and hire third
parties to be careful as long as the gains outweighed the sacrifices.
Thus, bargaining would lead to efficiency in producing safety features,
warnings and instructions to users, warnings to bystanders, care in
using products, caution in standing or walking nearby, and so on. (Or,
another possible arrangement would be to make bystanders liable for
injuries to themselves. Again, if there were zero transaction costs,
voluntary exchange would lead to the same result as above, since the
third parties could costlessly get together and hire manufacturers to
make safer products or users to handle them more carefully. Whoever
could prevent accidents at the lowest cost would again be hired to pro-
duce the accident prevention.)109
Because of the stochastic or chance element in accidents, insurance
policies (as well as instructions and warnings) have value. Insurance
affects resource allocation, not merely because it is a product that be-
comes valuable under uncertainty, but also because, with the existence
of transaction costs, insurance affects behavior. Individuals will take
out more insurance as long as the extra gain exceeds the extra cost.
Due to information and other transaction costs, the premiums and
changes in the premiums cannot accurately reflect marginal risks; the
107 Perhaps the phrase never really meant complete customer liability. Hamilton says
that the first appearance of the phrase was apparently in the 16th century, and even
then there was a condition attached: "... . if he [a horse offered for sale] be tame and
have ben rydden upon, then caveat emptor." Fn nzraRT, BoKE oF HUSBANDRIE § 118
(1534), quoted in Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.. 1133, 1164
(1931).
108 Zero transaction costs also implies zero costs of information about products' charac-
teristics, though not a world of complete certainty in this analysis, for such a world would
have no accidents, unforeseen events, or doubts about liability.
109 Even in these hypothetical situations yielding efficiency, many would object to the
fairness of making the customers rather than some other set of persons bear whatever
cost is incurred (though the cost of accidents would be partly shifted, much as most tax
burdens are partly passed on to other groups).
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careful and the lucky will to some extent subsidize the careless and
the unlucky. If there were certainty, of course, no one would insure
the ones who were going to have accidents, and no one who was not
going to have accidents would pay for insurance. Since premiums will
"have more nearly lump-sum than marginal tax effects,"u 0 and will
not be fully sensitive to individual behavior, the insurance holders
will tend to use less care as long as this pays, and to buy less safe
equipment as long as the extra gain exceeds the extra cost. While in-
dividuals in general are reaching preferred situations, since they value
insurance more than the costs, one would expect total accident costs
to go up. Moreover, this might subject bystanders and those who do
not choose to carry insurance to somewhat greater dangers."'
Transaction costs are important to one's views on products liability
mainly, however, because they affect the bargaining process in con-
nections other than insurance. Contracting for more safety features
or more cautious use of products with a million individuals separately,
forming groups to negotiate smaller numbers of contracts, deciding in
specific instances precisely what each contract means, enforcing agree-
ments when people have enough assets to honor their bargains, en-
forcing contracts when parties go bankrupt-all these activities are
expensive (in some circumstances extremely expensive).
With customer (or product owner) liability, however, note that
certain transaction costs are in fact relatively low. The costs to users
of hiring producers to make safer products and issue warnings and in-
structions would be comparatively low, for the established market
relationships would permit customers to register their preferences and
exchange money for safer products, instruction, and so on. To many
people who have become acutely aware of the hazards of using -uodern
products, or to those convinced that private enterprise is malevolent,
the preceding statement may seem laughable, for if one visualizes him-
self as being injured, financially or physically, by defective merchan-
dise, it does seem that he is at the mercy of producers. It is frustrating
to have a persistent oil leak in a new car, to find that your dry cleaner
has lost a pair of your trousers (though he insists that you must have
lost them), to find that a hairspray has caused your wife to have an
outbreak of eczema. Nonetheless, as these disappointments occur to
thousands of customers, they turn to other products or producers-un-
less upon reflection they prefer the "lower price plus that risk" to
"higher prices with reduced risks." Producers find it profitable to make
110 Williamson, Olson & Ralston, Externalities, Insurance, and Disability Analysis, 84
ECONOMICA 235, 244 (1967).
tll One can observe some of the effects of insurance, in the presence of information
and enforcement costs, in the rising costs of various forms of health insurance.
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a larger proportion of their products safer, issue instructions and warn-
ings, carry insurance, and have better warranties or more generous re-
turned-goods policies. Hence, while disappointments and injuries
never cease in a changing and uncertain world, customers are able in
the aggregate to influence product design simply by turning to com-
petitors and bidding more for the goods that they prefer.
Transaction costs become greater if customers deal with firms that
are protected from the entry of competitors. They have to appeal to
customers, but they may not cater to customers' preferences as fully
as they would if threatened by rivals. Transaction costs are still higher
if one buys from a government agency and tries to hire this producer to
offer a safer, or cheaper but less safe, or otherwise modified product. If
the post office loses your books, or the public school damages your
child, or a regulatory agency refuses to allow you to buy synthetic milk
that looks like cow's milk, or a publicly owned highway or reservoir
strikes you as being dangerous, the threat of your turning to competi-
tors will not affect the design of the output. Hiring these producers or
regulators to alter product design takes the more expensive form of
organizing pressure groups to register voter preferences.
Buyer liability would hold another transaction cost in check: the
cost of information about what degree of product safety for particular
uses is economical, that is, does not result in an excess of costs over
gains as seen by each individual for himself. The buyer-user is in a
better position than anyone else to know the exact use he plans to
make of a product and what alternative qualities, or degrees of safety,
would do to his costs and gains. The manufacturer knows more about
the product, but the customer, if he is liable, has a special incentive
to obtain and make appropriate use of this information. To get the in-
formation, the buyer must deal, not with thousands of individuals, but
with the seller and a few other identifiable persons. The result will
not be the acquisition of complete information; it will not be the
existence of perfect foresight or the absence of all mistakes and in-
juries. Whatever the product liability rule, the world will still be full
of accident, tragedy, and disappointment. The only assertion here is
that customer liability would often reduce part of the information
costs, enabling voluntary exchange to go a bit further.
For some product categories such as new and complex items, how-
ever, customer liability might well lead to higher information costs
than, say, producer liability. In the process of exchange, customers
probe to find out how much information it is profitable to buy, and
producers probe to determine how much it is profitable to produce.112
112 Perhaps it should be noted that I am not considering fraud or deliberate misrepre-
sentation. These phenomena, like theft or contract violations, are undeniably expensive,
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With caveat emptor, the generation of the efficient amount of informa-
tion may take quite a while, with either excessively cautious or in-
sufficiently cautious use of the product occurring during the interim.
For product categories like new drugs, 1 3 the process might well be
comparatively expensive. One cannot legislate these information costs
out of existence, but it is always possible that intervention or different
incentives would yield more gains than costs (vice versa is also emi-
nently possible). Putting liability on the physician, 114 for example,
might induce him to acquire more information, reveal more informa-
tion, and use new drugs more cautiously. The result would be partly
cost and partly gain, but the magnitudes would be very difficult to
ascertain. As Demsetz has pointed out, in deciding what government
intervention is efficient, "[t]he primary problem [since the effects or
"'outputs" are not marketed]... is the estimation problem. '115
Customer liability would also keep another transaction cost com-
paratively low-that of bribing the users to be careful in employing
the product. For the user would most frequently be the customer or an
acquaintance or a member of his family. Thus, if he is liable for losses,
he has to get the cooperation, not of thousands of strangers, but of him-
self and a few individuals with whom he has frequent personal contact,
in insuring the exercise of an appropriate degree of care. This does
raising information and other transaction costs and reducing the scope for voluntary
exchange; and they warrant considerable (though not an infinite) expenditure of resources
to deter them.
113 To see the difficulty vividly, pick up an issue of the Journal of the American
Medical Association and look at the advertisement for an anti-depressant, say Tofranil.
You will find warnings about possibilities of conduction defects, arrhythmias, and tachy-
cardia; warnings against use by patients receiving guanethidine; and mention of dozens
of side effects. Most persons will recognize some of these side effects, such as drowsiness,
impotence, or decreased libido; but how many will know what alopecia, eosinophilia,
and agranulocytosis are? (The package circular indicates dozens of other possible adverse
reactions, and there are additional side effects that are not yet listed.) Needless to say,
the patient knows little about which effects are important and probable. The informa-
tion has to be interpreted by a physician, and, quite understandably, he rarely mentions
these effects or gives the frightening circular to the patient. He simply judges (inevitably
on the basis of fragmentary information about the patient and the drug) whether the
drug seems likely to do more good than harm, and tells the patient to keep in touch as this
is strong medicine. The patient must fall back on getting information about alternative
doctors and on choosing his doctor wisely. The point here is (a) it is costly for each of the
parties involved to get information, (b) the value of the information that might be
acquired is of uncertain value, for information acquisition (like research and develop-
ment) is a search for something whose features are initially unknown, and (c) it may
take a long time for caveat emptor to lead to an equilibrium. It is certainly possible that
a different liability assignment would reduce total costs.
114 See Averbach, Physician's Liability for Prescription Drugs, 43 ST. Jorm's L. Ray.
535 (1969).
115 Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J. LAw & EcoN. 61, 68 (1966).
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not mean that he will be as cautious as it is humanly possible to be;
it merely means that he will choose by weighing the costs of extra care,
such as loss of time, against the benefits, such as the reduced risk of
suffering uncompensated losses.
With user liability it is expensive-as it would also be with either
victim or producer liability-for potential bystander victims to get to-
gether and bid for safer products, better instructions, more warnings,
greater care by the user, and so on. In fact, I can visualize no arrange-
ment that would greatly reduce transaction costs for third parties in
bargaining for what they prefer. One could make taxpayers liable for
all bystander claims-and one might prefer this from the viewpoint
of fairness-but the arrangement would not facilitate discovery of
what price various third parties would pay to have safer products.
Customer liability without fault would not impose as strong a de-
terrent to dangerous products as would liability according to fault,
for any deterrent effect would depend solely on the threat of customers
switching to rival products. If liability were placed on the party at
fault, this would introduce an additional deterrent, the threat of lia-
bility if producers turned out clearly defective products that resulted
in injuries. Would customer liability without fault therefore yield in-
efficiency? It is difficult to say, for the answer hinges on whether the
shifting of patronage or that plus the instigation of lawsuits against
producers would yield lower total costs, including the costs of identify-
ing defects, of having accidents, and of adjudicating disputes. The
shifting of patronage takes time and also entails the cost of numerous
disappointments or accidents. A lawsuit over a defective product may
deter the production of it before many users have been injured, though
on the other hand court costs for maintaining this system are not
negligible. As a result, most persons would probably judge that cus-
tomer liability without fault would be inefficient in connection with
many products (for example, those that might cause serious or repeated
accidents) but efficient in connection with other products.
On balance, one can say only that customer liability without fault
has some consequences that many persons would regard as desirable,
but it will not by any means yield a tidy economy free of misery and
possible inefficiency. One may legitimately believe it is possible to do
better: perhaps because he has some criterion other than the one
(Pareto optimality) in terms of which we have been discussing costs
and gains; perhaps because information and transaction costs leave
room for doubt about one's success in working toward that criterion.
In short, while customer liability brings some advantages, there are
several major reasons that might make one oppose customer liability:
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(1) One might believe that he could negotiate through the political
process for liability assignments that would yield more equitable'"
results but that high transaction costs preclude arranging taxes and
subsidies that would yield an equally desirable wealth distribution and
economic efficiency. This is in my view a powerful-and understand-
able-element in the thinking of opponents of caveat emptor. They
believe they have a chance of securing a fairer outcome but no chance
of obtaining the fairer outcome plus efficiency. (2) One might attach
value to certain political procedures or arrangements per se and
simply not care much about economic efficiency or Pareto optimality.
(3) One might wish to protect other persons from taking the risks they
would voluntarily choose to take, because he believes they do not
know what is good for them. (4) One might believe that customer
liability leads to less economic efficiency than other arrangements, since
the issue is in doubt once negotiation and enforcement costs are recog-
nized. It is in doubt because we could not quantify negotiation and
other transaction costs if we introduced some other assignment of
rights, and we do not know exactly what the costs or sacrifices would
be if we introduced an element of compulsion (for example, com-
pelling all buyers to take a safer product), since there would be no
market observations to reveal what people would pay to have other
choices. Since the matter is in doubt where transaction costs leave us
with externalities, one must make personal judgments in deciding
what arrangement he believes would yield economic efficiency. One
person or a majority may judge that total costs could be reduced by
departing from customer liability.
What would be the probable consequences of making sellers instead
of users liable, but with fault and privity required-as has been the
case over many decades of our history? Roughly speaking, one could
say that in these circumstances the person judged to be at fault, or the
unlucky victim where no fault existed or at least no fault could eco-
nomically be determined, would bear the initial burden. Thus, users
or retailers not at fault might often bear the cost because fault could
not be established or because the court costs of trying to determine
liability would often be higher than the expectation of reimbursement.
Thus, sometimes the sellers and sometimes the buyers or users would
be liable. Users would have a greater incentive than they would have
under producer liability without fault to use products carefully and
to bargain for safer products. Also, lack of assets or bankruptcy would
sometimes shift the burden, and the possibility of these events would
affect resource allocation, again presumably inducing users, merchants,
116 That is, distributional impacts that one prefers.
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and third parties to be more careful and inducing users to bid more
for safer products, than would be the case with strict liability of
producers.
This arrangement induces most persons and producers to carry
liability insurance, and induces many product owners to carry accident
insurance, but insurance companies cannot ordinarily survive if they
pay off regardless of fault, and the system involves heavy court costs
whenever insurance companies or others deem it worthwhile to initiate
lawsuits. One of the costs that goes up with a fault system, then, is the
set of information, decision-making, court, and other transaction costs
associated with efforts to determine misuse, negligence, defects, and
other factors that may suggest fault. These costs are one of the reasons
that some have urged the adoption of new insurance schemes in con-
nection with automobile accidents. While most automobile accidents
are not products liability cases, their handling does involve some of the
same issues, and new liability schemes for such accidents will therefore
be discussed later in this paper.
A consequence of privity that has been much discussed is that, if
fault lies with the manufacturer, seemingly unnecessary costs are in-
volved if the final purchaser must sue the retailer, the retailer must
sue the wholesaler, and the wholesaler must sue the manufacturer. A
few cost-reducing devices have been introduced, but unquestionably
this is a large expense implied by a privity-fault system of liability
assignment. On the other hand, if the manufacturer can be sued di-
rectly, one might end up with the wholesaler and retailer being less
careful and, if there was doubt about who was to blame, with the
manufacturer suing the wholesaler and the wholesaler suing the re-
tailer. (The extreme case of making the manufacturer liable without
fault will be discussed later.) Still, it does seem that in some instances
some of the lawsuits entailed by the privity requirement could be
avoided.
The privity-fault system of liability assignment tends to increase
another transaction cost in comparison with the purchaser-without-
fault system: the cost of hiring users to be careful in choosing and
employing products. This cost goes up because, with the lowered
probability that the purchaser will be liable, the cost to him of being
less careful or of selecting a less safe product goes down; he will tend to
take more of "less careful behavior" and "less safe products," and
hiring him to behave otherwise becomes more difficult. Determining
how many "units" of extra care one's payment was buying, and making
sure that the user did in fact exercise that much extra care, would be
prohibitively expensive. The magnitude of this impact might be small,
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for the net reduction in the penalty for carelessness might be small.
After all, carelessness would in any event bring some cost-some
probability of pain and inconvenience (or even death) and the residual
probability of being liable. But the direction in which behavior would
shift is surely clear.
Buyers will still have a relatively cheap way of registering their
preferences and hiring producers to produce the safety features that
buyers are willing to pay for. As before, their willingness to pay dif-
ferent amounts for different products would shape the profitability of
different product lines and designs. Producers will now carry liability
insurance, however, which may affect the other penalty for producing
less safe products-the expected cost of being held liable. Insurance
premiums cannot economically be adjusted neatly to reflect risks. If
a less safe product is involved in only a few small lawsuits against the
insurance company, it may have little or no impact on the insurance
premium that a producer must pay. Beyond some threshold, though,
a bad record may bring a sizable increase in a producer's insurance
premium. As noted earlier, the effect may be more like a lump-sum
tax than a marginal tax on unsafe products, watering down the ten-
dency of a fault system to induce the producer, over certain ranges, to
turn out safer products. Perhaps it should be mentioned again that
these changes in liability assignment have such effects because transac-
tion costs make it uneconomical for voluntary exchange to "get around"
special constraints or institutional arrangements.
What are the consequences of moving further toward producer
liability-of reducing the chances that the purchaser will be held liable
and of increasing the chances that the producer will have to bear the
burden? This, to repeat, is what seems to have happened. 117 The con-
sequences of further moves in that direction would be to intensify the
impacts noted above. One might expect more court cases and court
costs, greater difficulties in bribing purchasers to be careful, more
efforts to publish warnings and instructions (perhaps disclaimers, if
they still gave producers some shelter), a greater tendency to produce
safer products, a smaller range of product choice for poor consumers,
and a partially offsetting tendency to neglect safety because of the more
extensive use of liability insurance.
Let us turn now to a rather extreme arrangement that has been
mentioned in recent years-producer or manufacturer liability with-
out fault or defect. As in the other cases, if there were zero transaction
costs, producers could bribe customers to be careful, bystanders could
pay users to be careful and producers to issue safer products, and
117 See generally Part II supra.
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customers could hire producers to provide desired safety features. Each
would take these actions as long as the extra gain exceeded the extra
cost, and resource allocation would end up at an efficient point. With
transaction costs, however, producer liability without fault would
alter resource allocation quite a bit. The manufacturer would simply
be held liable for all injuries occurring with the use of his product,
regardless of circumstances. The cost of hiring thousands of purchasers
or third parties to exercise care would be huge, and therefore these
persons would now find it comparatively inexpensive to be careless.
Accident rates would rise, and producers, being liable, would find
it economical to restrict their product lines to safer products and de-
signs. The net impact on accident costs is not dear, but total costs
would increase, because accident prevention would not be produced
by those having a comparative advantage in doing so. Consumers
would face a narrower range of choice, an important sacrifice, but one
that is impossible to evaluate in any generally valid fashion. Poor
people would be hardest hit by this particular cost, because their
options would now be to buy relatively expensive, safe products or
nothing at all. Insurance premiums would be prohibitively high ex-
cept on extremely safe products, thus doing little to weaken the shift
toward such product lines.
Disclaimers would serve no purpose and would disappear. Unlike
the case of purchaser liability without fault, disputes and court or ad-
ministrative costs would not be nil, because even if fault did not have
to be established, the fact and extent of injury presumably would have
to be established. (Otherwise, claims would be infinitely large.) The
higher accident prevention costs would be paid largely by the cus-
tomers in each industry in the form of higher prices. Consumers in
some industries that already produced extremely safe products (for
instance, paper dips, books) might be affected, for as people shifted
their purchases away from the higher prices in Industry A, it might
drive up prices in Industry B. Also, producer rents would be
reshuffled somewhat; owners of inputs that had been receiving rents
in industries producing comparatively unsafe products would now
find the demand for those inputs declining, and those owners would
bear part of the burden while owners of certain other inputs would
begin collecting economic rents. Whether or not one regarded these
shifts in wealth distribution as being fair would depend upon the
precise impacts and upon one's value judgments.
Such effects on wealth distribution lead to questions about other
possible arrangements. Many persons believe it is more equitable to
spread the burden of accident costs over all the customers of particular
1970]
The University of Chicago Law Review
industries,""8 for example, to spread the burden of aircraft accidents
over customers of airlines or aircraft manufacturers or both. As far
as equity is concerned, however, this redistribution still seems to be
rather arbitrary. Why not shift the burden, or part of it, to another in-
dustry, or to a collection of corporations and their customers? But how
can one feel confident that these persons would be those with "deep
pockets"? How about shifting the costs to taxpayers in general, since
we believe that we have a somewhat progressive tax structure?
One way of accomplishing this would be to have government com-
pensate people for all losses without regard to fault. Of course a claim
that an injury or loss had occurred would have to be checked, so there
would still be this sort of administrative or court cost. Note, however,
that neither customers nor manufacturers (nor bystanders) would now
have to worry about bearing the burdens, so that carelessness in design
and use of products would become relatively inexpensive. As the cost
of selling unsafe products went down from producers' standpoints, they
would take more of this action. As the cost of failing to inspect prod-
ucts or of using products carelessly went down from customers' stand-
points, they would take more of these actions. If officials or taxpayers
thought of hiring these persons to alter their behavior, ordinary bar-
gaining would be prohibitively expensive. One way to induce them
to behave differently would be to change the law and revert to the
assignment of liability to purchasers and/or producers, but the trans-
action costs of getting laws changed are exceedingly high. Besides, our
purpose at this point is to examine the implications of taxpayer lia-
bility.
It is almost certain that voters and their representatives would be
displeased with this situation. Costs would rise too much. Liability
insurance-in this extreme arrangement-would serve no one's pur-
pose and would disappear. Without governmental regulation, warnings
and instructions would decline in importance in comparison with a
producer liability system. To make taxpayer liability workable, govern-
ment would have to devise a vast network of specifications for products,
rules for their use, and required instructions and warnings. Some of
the "unavoidably unsafe products" might be banned altogether. Pro-
ducers would inevitably face penalties (a kind of liability) for violating
the specifications and requirements. Again, consumers would find
their choice narrowed, as they would be unable to buy cheaper, al-
though relatively unsafe, products if they preferred them. Penalties
for negligence in using products would be devised in order to enforce
118 Some of the burden would be borne by owners of spedalized inputs, such as
laborers with spedalized skills.
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regulations concerning the use of products. Enforcement costs would
be high. In the end costs would be shared by taxpayers, customers and
potential customers, and to some extent by certain owners of inputs
that had formerly collected rents (though owners of certain other in-
puts would now be better off).
Liability for automobile accidents is a quantitatively important ex-
ample of liability assignment that has received considerable publicity
in recent years. Most automobile mishaps involve either driver negli-
gence or plain bad luck rather than defective products, yet the acci-
dents result from using a product. If one considers eliminating the
fault principle, it is hard to distinguish these cases from the products
liability category. In any event, these accidents raise many products
liability issues, and I believe it is worthwhile to examine them.
For many years there has been much dissatisfaction with the current
liability arrangements.19 Since many variables contribute to the gene-
sis of accidents-weather, visibility, drivers of the cars involved, driv-
ers of other vehicles, pedestrians, dogs, the precise condition of brakes
and other equipment even if not "defective," and road conditions-it
is very difficult to assign responsibility. Court and administrative costs
are high, and the outcomes are often inequitable in the eyes of many
persons.120 Many specific features of the present system are of in-
terest-court congestion (it often takes several years for a suit to come
to trial), the lack of any way to collect partial reimbursement in ad-
vance unless the case is settled out of court, the tactics used, the unre-
liability of witnesses' observations and memories (quite apart from
perjury), the chances of winning in court (if the injured victims were
at fault in any way, they cannot collect), the chances of collecting once
one wins (insolvent defendants), the economics of out-of-court settle-
ments. But all of these things lead to two general observations: the
system is costly and often unfair. Naturally, the question arises: Can
a better system, or one that most persons would prefer, be devised?
Although a number of variants have been considered, the one that
has probably attracted most attention is the Keeton-O'Connell Basic
Protection Plan. Under this Plan motorists would be compelled to
carry insurance, with competing private companies, and victims would
be compensated without regard to fault. The amounts to be paid
would not be according to a fixed schedule for various injuries, as it
119 See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcrhm: A VOLUN-
TARY Co MPENsATIoN PLAN (1954).
120 For excellent discussions and more details, see Green, supra note 106, at 67-80; or
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNE.L, AFTER CARS CRASH: THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND INSURANCE RE-
roR.m (1967). The original Keeton-O'Connell study was BAsic PROTECTION FOR TBE TRAFFIc
Vi-ru. (1965). It includes a lengthy bibliography on the subject.
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is under workmen's compensation, but would presumably be accord-
ing to receipted bills from hospitals, doctors, etc., as is usually the case
under major medical insurance. Thus, as far as motorists are con-
cerned, it would be compulsory loss or accident insurance rather than
liability insurance.
To achieve the economies that are being sought, there would be a
ban on negligence suits for less than $10,000 and on pain and suffering
suits for less than $5,000.121 These bans would presumably reduce court
costs, since in many instances, suits could not plausibly be initiated
for amounts as large as the above. However, if lawyers would accept the
cases on a contingent fee basis, there would be an increase in the
number of negligence suits for $10,000 and pain and suffering suits
for $5,000.
I am not clear about what would happen to pedestrian victims, but
their claims might be thrown into the category of "assigned claims"-
those that are assigned to individual insurance companies in some
designated proportion. The claims of motorists who seem to be injury
prone (high-risk drivers) might be handled as assigned claims also,
though Keeton and O'Connell apparently would not raise their pre-
miums. Nor would they raise the premiums of drivers who were in-
volved in numerous accidents even if they themselves suffered few
injuries. The authors suggest that it appears to be politically impossible
to charge bad drivers the full cost of the risks they generate or to "rule
bad drivers off the road." At the same time they seem to feel that high
rates to bad drivers have little deterrent effect over and above the
deterrent effect of legal penalties.
What would one expect to happen?12 2 To repeat an old refrain, if
there were zero transaction costs, voluntary exchanges could lead the
economy to an "efficient" (Pareto-optimal) allocation of resources
under this liability assignment too; for drivers, manufacturers, in-
surance companies, and third parties could hire each other to act so
that the Pareto optimal amount of accident prevention would be
undertaken and the actions would be taken by those having a com-
parative advantage in doing so. In the real world about all we can say
is that certain costs would be increased, others decreased, and wealth
distribution altered slightly under the Keeton-O'Connell Plan.
121 As at present, one could not recover for pain and suffering in any event unless he
could show negligence.
122 For a thorough discussion of such automobile plans, see BLum & KALVEN, supra
note 104. See also Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and
Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965), and Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi:
Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L. REy. 239 (1967).
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It is almost certain that court and legal costs would be reduced, be-
cause fault determination would be irrelevant in most accidents. Since
the cost to motorists of small accidents would decline (they would
not be liable personally, and their insurance premiums would not be
sensitive to their accident records), such accidents would increase, but
small accidents would not lead to court cases. In major accidents,
there would still be suits for negligence and pain and suffering reim-
bursement. Even these accidents would presumably occur a bit more
frequently, but the cost to drivers of risking major accidents would be
reduced only a little; and people might exercise almost the same de-
gree of care at high speeds or in particularly dangerous conditions.
The number of $10,000 suits for negligence and $5,000 suits for pain
and suffering would increase, but these extra costs could hardly offset
the reductions in other legal costs.
Automobile compensation plans would increase other costs, how-
ever. One basic reason is that accidents (small ones especially) would
now be less expensive to drivers-that is, they would bring smaller
penalties-and motorists would be somewhat less concerned about
safety features in their cars, preventive maintenance, and careful driv-
ing. Accident rates could be expected to rise. Many people doubt this,
but in all the instances observed so far, people take more of any action
or commodity that is made less expensive (provided the attributes of
the item remain the same). To repeat an earlier point, people who
doubt that liability deters accidents usually feel: Who would be will-
ing to risk death just because the action would cost him a few dollars
less? But we risk death (increase slightly the chance of being killed)
every day to get a newspaper or a pack of cigarettes. People get into
hazardous occupations to earn a few extra dollars per month. Only
heroes or suicides take actions that involve extremely high probabil-
ities of death or serious injury, but all of us trade modest increases
in those probabilities for modest savings or rewards.
If accident rates increased, then accident costs would rise. Adminis-
trative costs would rise, not only because accidents were more numer-
ous but also because small claims that would have been dropped under
the fault system would be filed under a compensation without fault
system.12 3 Since it would presumably be easier to collect on fraudulent
claims, unless extra policing costs were incurred, there might be more
claims of that variety. Moreover, claims would be larger than under a
fault system. Just as people with broad coverage health insurance
enter hospitals more frequently, stay longer, take better rooms and
128 Blum and Kalven refer to this as increased "daims-conscdousness." LUm - KALVEN,
supra note 104, at 51-52.
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more service-automobile victims would accept more x-rays, better
treatment, longer hospitalization, and so on.
One cannot define with much confidence the magnitude of these
impacts. But to me it seems likely that the government would have
to regulate behavior and introduce other penalties if compensation
without fault were introduced. Under workmen's compensation, costs
have been high, fixed schedules of awards are used, victims are ap-
parently not fully compensated after all, and the experience has not
been entirely encouraging. 124 It seems likely that government would
have to extend and stiffen penalties for negligence in driving, set up
a fixed schedule of awards or pay only a percentage of each total claim,
or let insurance premiums get out of hand, penalizing poor persons
who need to drive. It is not clear that the final incidence of the
burdens would be particularly equitable.
If we examined a social insurance plan, similar comments could be
made. The consequences would be similar in nature, though I con-
jecture that they would be more drastic in degree if accident costs
were initially placed on the taxpayer. One may legitimately prefer
a compensation without fault or social insurance plan, but analysis
suggests once again that a free lunch is not to be expected: When con-
sidering a change that would bring gains, one cannot neglect the costs
or disadvantages against which the gains must be weighed.
V. CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS IN THE LrrERATURE
Are the implications of different assignments of liability being dis-
cussed critically? The answer, it seems to me, is generally "No." We
are not yet discussing these implications with much precision and
care. There are certainly exceptions, and the literature contains much
that is perceptive. For my purposes here, however, I shall focus at-
tention mainly on statements and arguments that may suggest a certain
amount of "negligence" in manufacturing our product of articles and
views about products liability.
One striking feature of the literature is the emphasis by many
writers on equity or fairness almost to the exclusion of any other con-
siderations. Perhaps this view of the literature is incorrect, but that
is the way it often comes through to this writer. If this is so, then we
are thinking uncritically in the same sense that the six blind men were
being uncritical in the old poem about feeling an elephant. (One man
decided the elephant was like a rope, another concluded it was like
124 Id. at 25; Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the Administration of Workmen's Com-
pensation, 386 MsNX. L. REv. 119 (1952).
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a wall, and so on.) I do not mean to say that fairness is unimportant;
on the contrary, it is clearly one of the most important considerations.
But one should at least ask himself whether or not there are other
relevant considerations in designing products liability policy.
At the extreme, most people recognize an interdependence between
their notion of equity in distributing wealth and the amount of wealth
to be distributed. They see too that it may be sensible to sacrifice some
of one objective to achieve some of another. For example, most persons
who regard it as equitable to guarantee that everyone is equally
wealthy, regardless of their behavior, realize that this might affect the
total amount produced and made available. In less extreme examples
of wealth redistribution, however, we often neglect even to inquire
about the consequences. Protecting and compensating consumers (or
producers, or third parties) are instances of wealth redistribution that
may have effects on total costs and net output in addition to their
impacts on fairness.
One may believe that these impacts on total costs and net output
would be trivial. In that case, the clear way to discuss the matter would
be to say: "I believe, though I cannot prove, that the effects other
than those on wealth distribution would be insignificant." And some
authorities have in effect done this-which is a more critical way of
examining policies than simply to ignore part of the considerations.
The emphasis on equity was illustrated earlier in this paper.125 Other
examples include such statements as: "Should a manufacturer, in a free
bargain, be able to limit or exclude his obligation? The answer to
this question is primarily one of loss allocation .... ,"126 Or consider
the following:
If in time the accident problem is solved through some com-
pensation scheme that covers the basic economic losses of ac-
cident victims, it will remain to be seen whether the law of
negligence as we know it today in this area will atrophy or will
survive in a diminished role to afford additional compensation
to victims whose injuries are caused by actual fault on the
part of others. Money damages, of course, can never really
compensate for the noneconomic losses resulting from per-
sonal injuries. Although it is therefore reasonable to exclude
such losses from coverage in any purely compensatory sys-
tem, inherent justice between the person injured and the
person who caused the injury may demand compensation
for such losses when the latter was actually at fault. Some-
125 See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
126 Comment, supra note 58, at 1705.
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thing of this sort has apparently taken place in England.
The adoption of broad social insurance to cover accident and
other losses has been followed by judicial limitation of strict
liability in tort. Liability for negligence remains, however,
and the problem of double recovery is resolved pragmatically
by deducting one-half of the social insurance benefits that
would be received for the first five years after the accident
from the damages for lost earnings.127
The passage seems to suggest that the accident problem is solely one
of finding a just compensation scheme. Prosser mentions that the law
of torts is "concerned with the allocation of losses arising out of hu-
man activities,' 128 and (although court decisions frequently do take
other factors into account) there is usually little in discussions of tort
law to indicate that anything else might be relevant to one's preference
regarding the law. Many other authorities appear to be concerned
almost solely with the question of who deserves sympathy-the man-
ufacturers or the consumers. 29 One writes that "[t]he trend toward
greater consumer protection is simply a manifestation, appropriate to
a mass-producing, mass-marketing, and mass-advertising culture, of a
purpose to lighten the burden of the plaintiff injured by defective
products or, I should add, by dangerously inadequate service."' 130
Moreover, whether or not the emphasis on equity reflects a neglect
of other considerations, the discussions of equity themselves often
appear to be somewhat uncritical. 31 While most of us would agree that
our ideas of fairness frequently call for compensating purchasers or
third parties, the issues are not simple if the compensation rules would
result in a reduced range of choice open to consumers. For it is the
poor in particular who would suffer if they could never elect to buy
a low quality item-never elect to shoulder extra risk in exchange for
a lower price. Reducing the options open to a poor person is a fur-
ther reduction in his well-being as he sees it.
127 Traynor, supra note 75, at 376. In connection with this passage Traynor cites
W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIEry 155, 158 (1959), and James, Social Insurance
and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 537 (1952).
128 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 6 (3d ed. 1964). See also his section on
"social engineering" beginning at 14, particularly the passages on the "capacity to bear
the loss" at 22.
129 See, e.g., Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection
under Warranty Law, supra note 34, at 268; Green, supra note 4, at 980.
130 Cowan, supra note 53, at 1092.
131 One writer, after mentioning some of the relevant economics literature, somehow
concludes, "Thus economic reasons support a defence of strict liability in terms of fair-
ness-an equitable distribution of losses." Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YAx L.J. 887, 925
(1967).
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Also, the issues are not simple if the compensation rules would
transfer wealth in a complex, partly capricious fashion-for example,
from one mixture of poor and rich consumers (or of rich and poor tax-
payers) to some other unspecified mixture of rich and poor persons.
And, in fact, the identity of those who would bear the burden under
different rules is not obvious. The problem is similar to that of the
incidence of excise or business taxes, where one can say something
about what groups will bear the burden but not much about the pro-
portions in which they will bear it or the circumstances of the in-
dividuals involved.
Blum and Kalven have discussed some of these issues thoughtfully,
raising the question, for instance, whether it is equitable to help par-
ticular groups of injured persons while doing nothing special for
others such as cancer victims. 132 Prosser has pointed out that the
manufacturers are sometimes small struggling concerns compared to
the retailers, who may be nationwide distributors or chain stores133 (the
implications in terms of the fairness of products liability rules simply
being unclear).
Thus, even if we all agreed that people below a certain wealth level
should be helped, or that unlucky victims regardless of wealth should
be helped, the unevenness of and uncertainties about the incidence of
the burdens would still make the issues complex. In the final analysis,
moreover, people are not agreed on criteria of fairness; so for this rea-
son, too, sweeping statements about what equity dictates are hardly
warranted. We must debate these important issues, but it would pre-
sumably be more helpful if we could do so with increased caution and
accuracy.
Many writers have given some attention to considerations other than
equity, such as the economic effects of alternative products liability
arrangements. Some of the discussions have been extremely perceptive,
but a good deal of the time the generalizations are too broad or the
inferences that are drawn are not warranted. Often there seems to be
a conviction that consumers have no influence on producers (or could
not conceivably prefer low quality outputs at low prices) or that pro-
ducers are completely free to behave as they wish. "To put the matter
bluntly, a large proportion of mass products are consciously made as
inferior as the traffic will bear and are advertised by conscious mis-
representation as far superior to their known quality. The combination
of low quality production and high quality lying makes it impos-
sible for those using the products of mass manufacture to distinguish
132 BLUM - KALvEN, supra note 104, at 42-44.
133 Prosser, supra note 36, at 816.
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good merchandise from bad without the services of a general testing
laboratory."'134 Or ". .. what of those products which are dearly un-
merchantable-in a phrase, third-rate merchandise ... ?"13 Or, accord-
ing to one opinion, "I would describe the tort simply in terms of a
policy prohibiting the imposition of an unfair 'bargain' upon members
of the public who are forced to buy a needed product."'136 I am fre-
quently angered by products that break, or by my failure to get more
information about products prior to purchase, or by advertisements
that annoy me. Yet it is not correct that producers can do whatever they
wish and survive, or that I have no option of buying better products,
or that I am unable to get more information about products, or that
advertising really misleads me much. Life is difficult; all one can do is
grope for better rather than worse arrangements.
Another tendency in discussing economic effects is to make strong
assertions where there is little evidence or even where there are tested
hypotheses that (until refuted) cut in the opposite direction. The fol-
lowing statement may illustrate this point: "Those who attack strict
liability seem to feel that they have dealt it its most stunning blow by
their reference to the effect upon the research on new drugs. A dose
examination of this assertion proves it to be without substance, how-
ever, since a company is impelled to search for and develop new drugs
for its very existence .... No company will go out of business be-
cause of increased tort liability."'3 7 This passage contains at least
two questionable conclusions, perhaps due to putting things on an all
or nothing basis. (1) No company will fail just because its costs have
been increased. A possibility that seems to have been discarded with-
out much evidence is that some would survive but some on the margin
would fail. (2) If companies do not fail, their behavior (for example,
the amount and nature of their research) will be completely unaffected.
Observations in other cases where an activity becomes more expensive
suggest that whatever companies survived would engage in somewhat
less, or less adventurous, research, though the quantitative significance
of the shift would be uncertain. On balance, the argument is a bit like
asserting, "A tax on milk will have no effects because dairy farmers
are impelled to produce milk for their very existence, and no dairy
farmer is going out of business because of increased taxes."
184 Cowan, supra note 53, at 1087.
185 Comment, supra note 58, at 1713.
136 Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 325-26, 405 P.2d 502, 507 (1965) (O'Connell, J., dis-
senting).
M37 Rheingold, uira note 69, ai 1017. . . . . .
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One frequently encounters statements that recognize the cost of pro-
ceeding in one direction but neglect the cost of going in the other
direction. For example, ".... due care should be encouraged by the
law. Carelessness can only lead to waste of both lives and dollars."138
Here it is recognized that carelessness in producing products (and pre-
sumably in using them) entails sacrifice. Proceeding in the opposite
direction, that is, exercising greater care, will not be free of charge,
however, for more quality control and caution also entail costs. Suffi-
cient care-enough to reduce the output of medicines or foods or to
slow ambulances or fire engines drastically or to delay delivery of
various products-would even sacrifice lives. Hence, as usual, in our
efforts to choose better policies we have to walk the tightrope, weigh-
ing the costs of moving in one direction against the costs of moving in
the other direction.
Another illustration of this point is provided by Prosser. "The pub-
lic interest in human safety requires the maximum possible protection
for the user of the product .... -139 If taken literally, "maximum pos-
sible protection" would reduce certain costs but would entail other far
greater ones, for all appliances, vehicles, and antibiotics would either
be banned or made as foolproof as is technically possible, which would
make them too costly for most of us to use. The public interest, as
defined by almost anyone, would hardly call for this result. If not taken
literally, the phrase gives no guidance, but presumably says merely that
the public interest requires the "appropriate" degree of protection for
the user of the product.
When people ponder the provisions of more information to con-
sumers, they often slip into the same sort of thinking. Consider some
remarks of a Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs:
The activities of the federal government in the 1960's
with respect to consumers rest on four pillars-the four con-
sumer rights articulated by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.
These are the right to be safe, the right to choose freely, the
right to be heard, and the right to be informed. These rights
are not merely clever phrases thought up by speech writers;
they are indispensable if consumers are to be effective part-
ners with producers and other organized interests in moving
America forward. ...
This concept of full information is the principle under-
138 Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective
Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 985 (1966).
189 Prosser, supra note 86, at 799.
19701
The University of Chicago Law Review
lying the truth-in-lending bill and the truth-in-packaging
bill. The consumer's right to have full information is also
the basis for the major recommendations flowing from the
conferences held by the President's Committee on Consumer
Interests....
Currently the concept of full information is not accepted
in all segments of our society. There is only one way in
which its acceptance will become widespread: the majority of
the American public must recognize its validity and be able
to express their opinion effectively. 140
These statements are intended merely to illustrate a point, for it
may be quite unfair to take these passages out of context and criti-
cize their authors. (It is not economical for anyone to take the time to
make all of his sentences rigorously correct.) These writers may have
used such phrases as "maximum possible protection" or "full informa-
tion" simply as shorthand ways of saying, "In my judgment it would
be appropriate to provide more protection and information than are
provided at present." Nonetheless, such quotations can serve our pur-
poses here-to indicate that critical examination of the issues would
lead one to complex and inconclusive arguments rather than to sweep-
ing and dogmatic generalizations.
Also in conclusion I might re-emphasize that the products liability
literature contains quite a few analyses which do recognize consider-
ations other than equity (such as economic effects), the inherent diffi-
culties of agreeing on what is equitable, the significance of permitting
or of interfering with individual choice, the relevance of the law of
demand and deterrence, and the possible impacts of products liability
laws on total costs and output 41 A few writers have even drawn on
the Coase theorem, recognizing that with zero transaction costs and
voluntary exchange the assignment of liability would make no dif-
140 Peterson, Representing the Consumer Interest in the Federal Government, 64 MiCHs.
L. R V. 1323, 1325-26 (1966).
Betty Furness, a more recent Special Assistant on Consumer Affairs, makes similar
recommendations: "Why shouldn't the housewife know there are 'x' number of hours of
service in her washing machine, or that the life expectancy of a toaster falls short of a
golden wedding anniversary? The manufacturer knows, and the marketer knows. Shouldn't
the consumer also know?" TIME, Jan. 5, 1968, at 38. This makes it sound as though such
information exists as a unique number rather than as some sort of probability distribu-
tion, as though consumers are more foolish than I believe them to be, as though they
cannot get more information at present if they are willing to pay higher prices, and as
though it is obvious how much information it would be efficient to provide.
141 See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 138; Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in
Modern Tort Law?, 53 VA. L. REv. 886 (1957); Plant, supra note 11.
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ference to resource allocation, but also recognizing that in the real
world the implications of liability assignment are often complex and
uncertain. 142
142 See, e.g., G. CALARESi, THE CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970) and Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1965); BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 104.
